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 This thesis attempts to estimate the effect of Chinese development aid on good 
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa over time. The motivation of this thesis is the growing 
importance of China as a donor, and the many assumptions about China`s negative effect on 
Governance. China follows the principles of non-interference and South-South cooperation 
their development aid allocations, and as a consequence, they are criticized for being motivated 
by their own economic and diplomatic interest, rather than the needs of recipients. Chinese aid 
is therefore characterized as “rough aid”.  
However, China discloses very little information of their aid allocations. As such, few 
quantitative empirical studies confront the various claims about Chinese rough aid. The 
research lab AidData has recently introduced a new open-source methodology for collecting 
data on Chinese aid, and created a database on Chinese development finance to Africa between 
2000 and 2013. Now that data is available, it is both possible and needed to fill the gap in the 
literature. 
 The analysis compares the effect of Chinese aid on good governance to the effect of 
Western aid. The thesis analyzes the effect within 29 Sub-Saharan African countries between 
2000 and 2013, using panel data regression models. I find that China does not have a positive 
effect on good governance, but it is not possible to say with certainty that the general effect is 
negative either. I do not find any effect of Western aid on good governance over time. 
Additionally, I find no evidence that China harms the effectiveness of Western aid. The results 
are robust to several changes in the model specifications. 
 The sharpest critique of Chinese aid is that is that it will diminish the effectiveness of 
Western aid, which in turn will lead to worse governance in recipient countries. The finding 
that China does not harm the effectiveness of Western aid can therefore have important 
implication on policy and the debate on Chinese “rough aid”. The findings suggest that the 
intensions of donors may not have any general impact on good governance, and that it might 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Research Question and Background 
Development aid plays an important role as an economic reward and punishment 
mechanism between nations. Since the 1990s, the allocations of development aid from 
traditional Western donors has increasingly come with political conditions attached, 
specifically with regards to good governance. Consequently, development aid is frequently 
given for political reasons rather than for economic needs or poverty alleviation alone (Stokke, 
1995 (2006), p. 1; Smith, 2007, p. 1). With the ongoing redistribution of world power, 
development aid from emerging donors operating outside the OECD`s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) has increased rapidly (Dreher & Fuchs, 2015, p. 989). Countries that 
traditionally have been categorized as developing countries are now providing alternative 
sources of development finance to developing countries, and are challenging the existing 
international development regime. The most important emerging donors include India, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Mexico, Russia, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Thailand, and in the 
lead of this group; China (Woods, 2008, p. 1205). These donors reject, at least partial, the DAC-
related principles and practices when they provide development assistance. Hence, they do not 
involve themselves in the internal politics of the recipient country (KilamaFIKS, 2016, pp. 77-
78; Woods, 2008, p. 1207). 
 The growing importance of China as a donor has raised concerns that it is destabilizing 
the international aid architecture. Moisés Naím (2007, pp. 95-96), former editor and chief of 
the journal Foreign Policy, characterized China`s development aid as “rough aid”, claiming that 
it is unrelated to the needs in developing countries, but rather motivated by China`s own 
national interest. Moreover, emerging donors are said to undermine the development efforts of 
Western donors to promote good governance in the developing world, by allowing the 
governments of developing countries to “shop around” for the development assistance that best 
suits their interest. In other words, to shop around for donors that are soft on bad governance 
and that are prepared to tolerate or even participate in corruption. However, this hypothesis is 
primarily based on informed assumptions and selective case studies. Few quantitative empirical 
studies confront the various claims about Chinese rough aid. As such, it is not clear whether or 
not the average effect Chinese aid differs from the average effect DAC aid (Dreher & Fuchs, 
2015, p. 989; Strange, et al., 2015, p. 3; Naím, 2007, pp. 95,96).  




«Does Chinese development aid have an effect on good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa? ». 
 
1.2. The Aim of the Study 
This thesis will focus on three key factors, the dependent variable good governance, and 
the independent variables Chinese development aid and development aid from DAC donors. 
The focus of this thesis is how Chinese development aid affects good governance. The study 
attempts to go one step further than the traditional focus on Western aid in Sub-Saharan Africa 
by including Chinese aid. The study is motivated by two factors, one theoretical and one 
empirical. The relationship between development aid and governance has been studied 
carefully, and today there is a large literature on the subject. Despite considerable amount of 
studies on the theme, academic research has not been able to reach consensus on the effect of 
development aid on governance (Quazi & Alam, 2015, pp. 16-17; Knack, 2001, pp. 311-314; 
Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, pp. 260-265). On the one hand, several studies argue that 
development aid can affect the quality of governance positively by improving the quality of 
administration, boosting policy and planning capacity, and strengthening central institutions 
(Quazi & Alam, 2015, pp. 16-17; Knack, 2001, pp. 311-314; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, pp. 
260-265).  
On the other hand, a number of studies argue that development aid diminishes good 
governance by encouraging corruption and other rent seeking activities, fuels conflicts between 
interest groups over access to aid funds, and seize human resources from the public sector to 
aid-funded projects. A third part of the literature does not find any significant relationship 
between development aid and good governance (Quazi & Alam, 2015, pp. 16-17; Knack, 2001, 
pp. 311-314; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, pp. 260-265). The lack of theoretical consensus on the 
effect of traditional aid challenges the hypothesis that Chinese aid will lead to worse 
governance. If there is no clear evidence that Western aid with political conditions attached has 
a positive effect on good governance, why should Chinese development without political 
conditions lead to worse governance? Moreover, are the consequences of Chinese development 
aid any different from the consequences of DAC aid?  
The second motivation for this thesis is empirical. Literature on aid effectiveness is 
largely dependent on data on development finance from Western donors and international 
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institutions, and published research ignores the possible impact of Chinese aid. Given the scale 
of Chinese aid, not including it in empirical research will lower research validity. In addition, 
to the extent that China gives aid where traditional donors are absent or where they increase aid 
when traditional donors retreat, ignoring Chinese aid could severely bias empirical results. 
Including China and other emerging donors is an essential step towards developing more 
accurate theories on aid effectiveness in developing countries (Strange, et al., 2015, pp. 3, 13-
14). Data on the allocations of Chinese development aid is difficult to obtain because Beijing 
discloses very little information about its financial activities. Without comprehensive data, 
scholars have not been able to confront the various claims about Chinese rough aid empirically 
(Dreher & Fuchs, 2015, p. 989). However, the internationally recognized development research 
lab AidData has recently introduced a new open-source methodology for collecting information 
on project-level development finance, and created a database on Chinese development finance 
to Africa between 2000 and 2013 (Strange, et al., 2015, p. 1). Now that empirical data is 
available, it is both possible and needed to fill the gap in the literature.  
 
1.3.  Relevance of the Theme 
Since the mid-1990s, the theory of good governance has made strong impact on research as 
well as in policy circles, especially those dealing with developing countries (Gisselquist, 2012; 
Dellicour & Sacaze, 2012, p. 551; Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012). Good governance is today an 
important feature of both bilateral and multilateral development aid, and there is broad 
consensus in the literature that good governance is important for development. While it is 
recognized that outside support is unlikely to deliver results unless there is political will within 
the country, donors are said to have an important role in promoting good governance in recipient 
countries (Gisselquist, 2012; Dellicour & Sacaze, 2012, p. 551). In 1998, former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan stated that “Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor 
in eradicating poverty and promoting development” (UN-University, 2017), and USAID 
proclaims that: “Without good governance, it is impossible to foster development, and no 
amount of resources can compensate for bad governance” (USAID , 2002).  
However, there is little consensus in the literature of how good governance can be achieved. 
The question of how to improve good governance is critical from a policy perspective as well 
as from a theoretical perspective. Many aid agencies and international organizations focus on 
democracy and democratic governance when they refer to good governance. However, I will 
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argue that good governance shod not be equated with democracy or democratic governance. 
This is primarily because good governance and democracy are two different regime 
characteristics, countries might have varying degree of good governance independent of their 
democratic status (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012, pp. 21-22). Secondly, in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
most countries are not democracies (Puddington & Roylance, 2017; Marshall, 2014).  
 Development aid has been an important part of Western countries` foreign policy since 
the Second World War. As aforementioned, the global development landscape is currently in a 
period of change, as emerging donors are representing a growing proportion of the total amount 
of development aid. China is by far the largest emerging donor, and as China`s influence in the 
World expands, it is necessary and important to study the possible effects of Chinese power. 
The unique way China designs and delivers development aid is said to challenge traditional 
policies and practices of Western powers (Parks, 2015). Various scholars and policy makers 
have warned against the consequences of Chinese aid. It is said that the possible risk of Chinese 
loans to low-income countries may prejudice their debt situation because of inappropriate 
terms, postpone necessary adjustment because of the lack of conditions, and waste resources on 
unproductive investments (Woods, 2008, p. 1207).  
These concerns are all important to study. China will continue to expand its development 
aid abroad, and its power and influence in in the World. Therefore, I see this study as highly 
relevant in relation to development aid and political science in general. The findings on the 
effect of Chinese aid in Sub-Saharan Africa could have implications for how the DAC donors 
and international development community should relate to the Chinese expansion. In addition, 
the results can contribute to better understand how different types of development aid affects 
good governance. The inclusion of DAC donors in the analysis will have important comparative 
advantages.  
 The analysis uses a panel data regression model of 29 Sub-Saharan African countries 
between 2000 and 2013, to study the general effect of Chinese aid on good governance. I find 
that China does have a general effect on good governance over time, and that the effect is 
negative. I find no general effect of DAC aid on good governance, which could be explained 
by the complexity of bilateral DAC aid. The contrasting effects of Chinese aid and DAC aid, 
confirms that the two types of aid are very different and therefore have different effects within 
countries over time. The most critical finding in the analysis is the rejection of the interacting 
effect of Chinese aid on the effectiveness of DAC aid. This suggest that the presence of Chinese 
aid does not prevent good governance initiatives from traditional donors, which is one of the 
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sharpest critiques of China from traditional donors. The results are robust to different 
modifications of the main models.  
  
1.4. The Structural Outline of the Thesis 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 consists of a presentation of the conceptualization 
and theory of my dependent variable, good governance. Moreover, I will present the theoretical 
arguments of how development aid from China and DAC donors can affect good governance. 
In the second chapter, the hypotheses used to answer the research question are presented.  
Chapter 3 presents and elaborates on the quantitative method selected for the thesis. The 
method that will be used is panel data regression analysis.  
Chapter 4 presents the dataset and variables that will be used in the regression models. The 
dataset consists of variables form the Quality of Government project and AidData`s research 
release on Chinese development finance. 
Chapter 5 consists of the results of the regression analysis as well as an analysis of the 
results.  
Chapter 6 summarizes and discusses the main findings of the regression analysis in relation 
to the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2, and attempts to answer the research 
question. This chapter also discusses the limitations of the results of the study. Lastly, the 




Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, I will introduce the theoretical framework used to understand the 
relationship between development aid and good governance. The relationship between 
development aid and good governance is widely researched. However, academic research has 
not been able to reach consensus on development aid`s effect on good governance. First, I will 
present and discuss my dependent variable, good governance. I will here explain why good 
governance will be operationalized as “quality of government”. Secondly, I will present the 
three main theoretical directions on how development aid affects good governance, namely that 
development aid has a positive effect on the quality of governance, that development aid has a 
negative effect on governance. Thirdly, I will present the theoretical and empirical framework 
on how Chinese development aid affects governance. In this section I will present the theories 
explaining why Chinese development aid can have a negative effect on good governance, the 
theories of why Chinese aid might have a positive effect on good governance, and how Chinese 
development aid can have indirect influence on how Western development aid affect good 
governance. After each theoretical explanation, I will present the hypotheses that will be tested 
in this thesis.  
 
2.1. Theories of Good Governance 
This section examines the dependent variable of my thesis, namely the concept and 
theory of good governance. Accordingly, this section is divided into two subsections. In the 
first subsection, I will present and discuss the conceptualization of the term. In the second 
subsection, I will present the theory of good governance, and discuss why good governance is 
important for development.  
2.1.1. Conceptualization of Good Governance 
According to Wilkin (2011, p. 7) definitions of good governance are often broad and 
encompasses many agendas. Today, most organizations and institutions working on 
governance-related subjects have their own definition of the concept (see examples in Table 
2.1.). The numerous definitions of good governance have made conceptualization of the term 
itself debated, and not just how good governance might affect a political outcome. The problem 
of definition happens when moving from defining governance, to defining good governance. 
The concept of good governance is a normative term, and will include normative views on what 
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“ought to be”. Different definitions vary in the degree in which they imply particular policies 
or political outcomes, or particular institutional designs or processes. Good governance is often 
very broadly defined, and can therefore be hard to distinguish from other similar concepts, such 
as development itself or democracy (Grindle, 2007, p. 555).  
An important distinction to make is the difference between government and governance, 
which is crucial to the language of political conditionality and development objectives.  
Governance means government plus some additional components such as public policies, 
institutions, a system of economic relationships, or the role of non-governmental sector in the 
business of the state. As opposed to the term governance, good governance express approval 
not only for a certain type of government (usually democratic) and its related political values 
(as respect for human rights), but also for certain kinds of additional components (Smith, 2007, 
p. 3). Leftwich (1993, p. 606) separate between two parallel meanings of good governance that 
often overlap in the literature. The first meaning of the concept refers to the World Banks 
definition of primarily the administrative and managerial terms. The second meaning of the 
concept is associated with Western governments, which in addition to focus on the 
administrative and managerial terms include an insistence on competitive democratic politics. 
Some of the definitions of good governance presented in table 2.1., might overlap with 
democracy. So why do we need concepts such as good governance if we could just talk about 
democracy? Holmberg and Rothstein (2012, pp. 21-22) argue that good governance is different 
from and should not conceptually be equated with democracy. The theoretical reason for this is 
that there is no guarantee that a majority will respect the impartiality principle when government 
power is to be exercised. For example, in an ethnically divided society, the ethnic majority, 
after have being elected, may decide that all citizens from the minority working in the civil 
service should be removed from their positions (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, p. 178).  
The empirical reason is that there is no straightforward relationship between establishing 
electoral representative democracy and many features of good government (Marshall, 2014). 
On the contrary, empirical research indicates that good governance is often worse in newly 
established democracies, such as in Peru under former president Fujimori. At the same time, 
some of the countries that have made some of the greatest progress in curbing corruption the 
last decades, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, have not been democracies. Despite the widely 
held belief that democracy foster development, this approach does not encompass democratic 
countries with bad governance and vice versa (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012, pp. 21-22; 
Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, pp. 178-179).  
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Rothstein and Teorell (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, pp. 167-168) argue that although 
much research on good governance exists, it has failed to address how quality of government 
should be conceptualized. Existing definitions are either extremely broad, they suffer from 
functionalist slant, or they only deal with corruption. Holmberg and Rothstein (2012, pp. 23-
27) highlight the importance of universalism when defining the concept. They argue that due 
to the great variations in institutional design and practices between countries, it is not fruitful 
to define the concept using specific institutional designs. Moreover, they argue that the best 
way to define the concept is to look for some basic norm that characterizes countries` 
institutional systems. They argue that the preferred way to conceptualize good governance, or 
quality of government (QOG), which is the term they use, is by impartiality in the exercise of 
public power. By impartiality, they mean that when a policy has been decided upon in the 
political system, the policy should be implemented according with the principle of impartiality, 
which lines with the principle of the rule of law or that all cases ought to be treated equally 
(Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012, pp. 23-27).  
Alternatively, as Cupit states (Rothstein, 2009, p. 314); “To act impartially, is to be 
unmoved from certain sorts of considerations – such as special relationships and personal 
preferences. It is to treat people alike irrespective of personal relationships and personal likes 
and dislikes”. Despite impartiality resembling the principle of rule of law, Rothstein (2009, p. 
314) argue that the norm of impartiality is broader than rule of law, because it applies to other 
spheres of the state that are not directly governed by law. When public policy is to be enacted 
in so-called “human processing” areas, such as in education, health care, welfare benefits, 
discretionary powers usually need to be transferred to lower-level government officials 
responsible for implementing policy. These spheres are not directly under the rule of law, but 
the norm of impartiality has to apply in such spheres as well, in a country with high quality of 
government or good governance (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, p. 182). Holmberg and Rothstein 
(2012, pp. 23-27) prefer the term impartiality to the term objectivity, because objectivity imply 
that humans have full knowledge of a case and can reach a decision as if some natural law 
process decided the outcome. The term impartiality, they argue, suggest a more human and 




1Table 2.1. Definitions of Governance and Good Governance  
Source What is governance? What is good governance? 
World Bank (n.d.) “The process and institutions 
which decisions are made 
and authority in a country is 
exercised” 
“Inclusiveness and accountability established in 
three areas: “Selection, accountability and 
replacement of authorities (voice and accountability; 
stability and lack of violence); efficiency of 
institutions, regulations, recourse management 
(regulatory framework; government efficiency); 
respect for institutions, law and interactions among 
players in civil society, business, and politics 




For IMF purposes, “limited 
to economic aspects of 
governance … in two 
spheres: improving 
management of public 
recourses …; supporting the 
development  and 
maintenance of a transparent 
and stable economic and 
regulatory environment 
conductive to efficient 
private sector activities …” 
(p. 4) 
“Ensuring the rule of law, improving efficiency and 
accountability of the public sector, and tracking 





“The exercise of economic, 
political and administrative 
authority to manage a 
country`s official affairs at 
all levels. It compromises the 
mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which 
citizens and groups articulate 
their interests, exercise their 
legal rights, meet their 
obligations and mediate their 
differences” (p. 12) 
Characterized as “participatory, 
transparent…accountable … effective and equitable 
… promotes the rule of law … ensures that political, 
social and economic priorities are based on broad 
consensus in society and that the voices of the 
poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in 
decision-making over the allocation of development 
recourses” (p. 12) 
The United States 
Agency for 
International 
Does not provide a clear 
definition of Governance 
that is not directly related to 
good governance 
“…a broad concept, encompassing the capacity of 
the state, the commitment to the public good, the rule 




(2002, p. 6) 
accountability, the level of popular participation, and 
the stock of social capital”. (USAID , 2002) 
Quality of 
Government Institute 
(QOG), University of 
Gothenburg 
(Rothstein & Teorell, 
2008; Holmberg & 
Rothstein, 2012) 
Does not provide a clear 
definition of Governance 
that is not directly related to 
good governance 
“Impartiality in the exercise of public authority” 
(Grindle, 2007; Johnsøn, 2016; USAID , 2002; Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008)  
Definitions of good governance often suffer from endogeneity. The Economist noted in 
2005 that:  
“… defining good governance as “good for economic development” may generate 
redundant explanations and meaningless policy implications: `What is required for 
growth? Good governance. And what counts as good governance? Whatever promote 
growth. And what is required for growth?`” (Sundaram & Chowdhury, 2012, p. 7). 
Such functionalist definitions of good governance often generate endogenous definitions. 
Endogeneity can here be understood as reverse or simultaneous causality, as such, good 
governance can be endogenous to development as well as to development aid1. The quality of 
government definition solves the problem of internal endogeneity, to some degree, because the 
definition is not functionalist, and is not defined using other concepts. Based on the conceptual 
discussion above, I will strongly argue in favor of defining good governance according to 
Holberg, Rothsten and Teorell`s concept of quality of government. If we define good 
governance as democratic governance, then why not just talk about democracy? The QOG 
definition created a middle-way between the administrative definition and the democratic 
definition, and it is better at dealing with the endogeneity problem2.  
                                                          
1 Development aid can lead to better governance, but donors can chose to give aid to countries because 
they have improved their quality of government or have better quality of government than another 
country. Hence, the causal relationship between good governance and development aid can go both 
ways. This is why it is crucial that econometric analyses are theory based. Even if the relationship is 
statistically significant in a regression model, it does not indicate causality per say, but a correlation 
between the variables. Causality can only be detected through theory and qualitative research (Gerring, 
2012, pp. 321-322) 
2 Note that the literature that is referred to throughout the thesis, defines good governance in different 
ways. It is important to keep the conceptualization of good governance in mind when looking at the 
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2.1.2. Good Governance and Development 
“Without good governance, it is impossible to foster development, and no amount of 
recourses can compensate for bad governance” (USAID , 2002, pp. 6-7).  
Around 1990, several major works within political science were published on 
governance (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; March & Olsen, 1989; Evans, et al., 1985; Steinmo, 
et al., 1992). The publications challenged the then dominating societal views, which argues that 
variables such as economic power configurations or the structure of class divisions are central 
in explaining political outcomes, and thereby social and economic outcomes. Contrary to the 
then traditional view, these scholars argued that political institutions were essential in 
explaining social and economic outcomes. In political science, this became known as “bringing 
the state back in”. The institutional approach turned the causal logic around by arguing that the 
type of political system in a society largely determines its economic and social development 
(Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012, p. 16). This assumption caused the donor community to increase 
their aid and loans that specifically target “good governance” in developing countries3 (Knight, 
2008, p. 5). Today the institutional approach is widely accepted and institutionalized within the 
field political science. 
Within development economics, the new approach leads to the recognition that the state 
plays a critical role even within a market-oriented society. The specific claim of good 
governance theory is that while markets failures in developing countries can be serious, the best 
way to address them is by improving the efficiency of the market through good government 
reforms. Instead of trying to improve the governance capabilities that would enable developing 
countries to directly correct market failure, the good governance agenda argues that if the 
government could create the conditions for markets to work efficiently, the market failure 
would be indirectly reduced and, with it, would the need for specific interventions to address 
these market failures. The argument is that market failure happens primarily because 
developing countries do not have well-defined property rights, a rule of law to handle conflicts, 
and a state that is restrained from expropriation and rent creation. These features of developing 
country markets raise the transaction costs of trying to agree on and enforce contracts in the 
                                                          
results of theoretical arguments of the effect of good governance, as well as results from empirical 
analysis. 
3 Despite the terms developing countries and developed countries has been criticized (I will not 
elaborate on this discussion here), I will use the term developing and developed countries for 
classificational reasons (UN, 2014, pp. 143-144) Additionally, these classifications are widely used in 
the literature I refer to throughout the thesis.    
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market. Which, according to an economic good governance theory, is the reason why markets 
fail in developing countries. Therefore, the good governance reform agenda can be described 
as an agenda for market enhancing governance (Springborg, 2009, pp. 195-197).  
Good governance is not just important for economic development in a country, it is also 
crucial for social or human development (Smith, 2007, p. 12). The United Nations (UN) argues 
that economic development is not a sufficient measurement of development in a country. They 
claim that development should include social dimensions, and have introduced the much-used 
Human Development Index (HDI) to measure development in the World. HDI defines 
development as a long life, political freedom, personal security, community participation, and 
guaranteed human rights, in addition to economic development (Haq, 1990, p. iii; Radelet, 
2006, p. 7). Economic and political scientists alike, argue that bad governance plays a central 
part in many of the World`s most pressing economic and social problems today. Because good 
governance is so important for economic and human development, I will argue that focusing 
on good governance in development research is crucial.  
Grindle (2007) criticize the concept and effect of good governance. She argues that 
achieving good governance calls for improvements in almost all aspects of the public sector, 
and how to get good governance raises dozens of questions about “what needs to be done, when 
it needs to be done, and how it needs to be done”. She introduces the concept of “good enough 
governance”. Good enough governance suggests that not all sides of good governance needs or 
can be tackled at once, and that building better governance takes time. Therefore, he suggests 
that attentions should be at the minimal conditions of governance necessary for political and 
economic development. In addition, she argues that methodological choices of how to study 
good governance can have decisive impact on empirical findings. While large-N4 studies tend 
to find consistent correlations between development and good governance, small-N studies tend 
to demonstrate that development is not fully dependent on “getting governance right” (Grindle, 
2007, pp. 553-555). Grindle (2007, p. 572) concludes, “the task of research and practice is to 
find opportunities, short of magic bullets, for moving in a positive direction [towards better 
governance], yet recognizing that this is not always possible”. As such, my methodological 
choice of studying good governance on a general basis by using a quantitative research design, 
are likely to affect the results I get.  
                                                          
4 Large-N studies are quantitative studies involving many cases. Small-N studies are qualitative 
studies involving one of few cases (Gerring, 2012, p. 429) 
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Some scholars take the opposite point of view in the good governance debate; they argue 
that good governance does not necessarily lead to development (Wilkin, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008, p. 13).The president of the World Bank, argued back in 2010 that development 
practitioners “should embrace `different policy approaches`, noting that `what might safeguard 
development in one context may strangle it in another`”. One cause of this debate is the rise of 
China (Wilkin, 2011, p. 61). Wilkin (2011, p. 62) argue that “While poor governance is 
correlated with extremes of development failure …, the converse is not true: good governance 
is not correlated with extremes of development failure”. To explain these cases in the good 
governance paradigm is difficult. He claims that under certain conditions, poor governance 
enables development-oriented oligarchs to thrive, which in turn trickles down on the society in 
general (Wilkin, 2011, p. 62). However, as I have discussed above, the objective of good 
governance and development is not just economic growth, but also includes social dimensions. 
Therefore, I will argue that good governance possible positive effects on development makes 
the concept important to study. 
 
2.2. Development Aid and Good governance 
 In the second section of chapter two, I will present the general theory of development 
aid its possible effects on good governance. The general theory of the effect of development 
aid is associated with development aid from DAC donors. The reason is that DAC donors have 
provided the majority of development aid for decades. Emerging donors did not provide 
substantial amounts of development aid until around year 2000 (Eggen & Roland, 2014, p. 87). 
In this section, I will first present the standard definition of development aid. Secondly, I will 
present the theory of why development aid can lead to better governance in developing 
countries. Thirdly, I will present the theory of why development aid could lead to worsen 
governance in developing countries. Lastly, I will present the theory of why development aid 
might not have any effect on good governance in developing countries.  
2.2.1. Definition of Development Aid 
Development aid or foreign assistance describes flow of funds from one country to 
another (Ear, 2007, p. 260), and the standard definition of foreign aid comes from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). DAC defines foreign aid or development aid as:  
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“Financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that are (1) designed to promote 
economic development and welfare as their main objective (thus excluding aid for 
military and or other non-development purposes); and (2) are provided as either grants 
or subsidized loans”. (Ear, 2007, p. 260) 
The DAC classifies aid flows into three broad categories. Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) is the largest, consisting of aid provided by donor governments to low- and middle-
income countries. Official Assistance (OA) is aid provided by governments to richer countries 
with per capita income above the Worlds Bank`s “high income” threshold, and to countries that 
were formally parts of the Soviet Union or its satellites. Private voluntary assistance (PVA) 
includes grants from non-government organizations (NGOs), religious groups, charities, 
foundations, and private companies. ODA is thus the type of aid that most people have in mind 
when discussing foreign aid (Radelet, 2006, p. 4), therefore, it is this type of Western 
development aid that will be analyzed in this thesis. 
 It is difficult to estimate the scale of development aid that goes directly to good 
governance. This is partly because of the different definitions of good governance employed by 
donors, but also because aid to social sectors such as education and health may contain 
governance-related projects and requirements. Much of development aid that is not directly or 
indirectly aimed at good governance reform can have conditions attached on improving good 
governance (Smith, 2007, pp. 9-10). Hence, development aid that is not directly aimed at 
promoting good governance might have an indirect effect on good governance. Since there are 
so many determinations of good governance, it is beneficial to define aid more broadly, than 
focusing on development aid aimed at good governance alone (Kotsadam, et al., 2017, p. 5). I 
will argue that Western development aid should be broadly defined as DAC aid, because I wish 
to study the effect of development aid in general, and not just the aid that specifically aims at 
building better governance. However, as the DAC-definition implies, I will focus on bilateral 
development aid, and not on development aid form international organizations and the alike, 
despite the fact that large sums of development aid from DAC countries are distributed through 
international organizations. Because Western aid will be compared to bilateral Chinese aid, it 
is natural to focus on bilateral aid form Western donors.  
2.2.2. How Development Aid from DAC Donors Can Lead to Better Governance 
 Good governance, as a development policy objective, has been strengthen the last 
decades and is an important feature of DAC donors` development policy. While recognizing 
that outside support is unlikely to deliver results unless there is political will inside the recipient 
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country, it is believed that donors have an important role to play (Dellicour & Sacaze, 2012, p. 
551). Good governance is crucial for the sustained and rapid growth in per capita income in 
poor countries. The question though, is how and if development aid can contribute to better 
quality of governance (Knack, 2001, p. 311). According to Bräutigam and Knack (2004, p. 256) 
improving governance means “building better bureaucracy, increasing adherence to the rule of 
law, reducing corruption, and managing expenditure and revenue generation in a sustainable 
manner”. Hence, good governance is in this sense the channel in which turns aid into 
development and growth (Rajan & Subramaniam, 2007, pp. 322-323). 
 From a theoretical point of view, development aid can release governments from 
binding revenue constrains, enabling governments to pay higher salaries to employees in the 
bureaucracy, and public employees generally, and strengthen domestic institutions. High levels 
of aid, channeled through governments with clear development agendas, can use aid funding to 
improve the quality of the civil service, strengthen policy and planning capacity, and establish 
strong institutions. Often, aid programs aim specifically at better training and technical 
assistance to strengthen legal systems, management of public finances, and accounting public 
offices. This type of aid programs has particularly been used by international institutions, such 
as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also by an increased 
number of bilateral donors. In many countries, aid personnel manage specific areas of 
government, and the mixture between technical assistance and recourses can improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of governance (Knack, 2001, p. 331; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, 
pp. 255-260).  
This is what happened when South Korea and Taiwan started receiving aid after WW2. 
Both countries had established strong post-colonial state institutions, where aid from the United 
States of America (US) played an important role in the successful development of the economy, 
the level of governance, and the society of the countries in general (Gray, 2013; Bräutigam & 
Knack, 2004, p. 260). In addition to the technical assistance to governments, development aid 
has the potential to release the binding constraint of low revenues for government committed 
to development. Some studies show that high levels of aid (above 30 % of GDP) promote 
growth when a country has good macroeconomic policies. Which in turn can generate new 
revenues for improvements in the quality of government (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, p. 260) 
Development aid can have a positive effect on good governance trough conditionality, 
by increasing the price of bad governance compared to good governance (Ear, 2007, p. 260). 
DAC donors and international organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF, put conditions 
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on their aid, often through the requirement to implement specific policies, to guarantee the 
release of funds or to improve the concessional terms of credit (Hernandez, 2015, p. 3). They 
believe that certain policies and actions are important for development and growth, and if 
government policies have failed in the past, providing aid will not bring about positive changes 
without fundamental governance change. The essence of conditionality has changed over time 
as the most important concerns have changed, as donors are trying to find the best way to apply 
conditions. Burnside and Dollar`s (2000, p. 864) findings suggest that “making aid more 
systematically conditional on the quality of policies would likely increase the aspects on 
developing country growth”. The argument is that conditions on aid allocations will increase 
the incentives of recipient governments to reform the public sector, which will lead to better 
governance in the recipient country (Knack, 2001, p. 313).  
The supply of conditions is traditionally viewed as a product of the negotiation between 
the donor and the recipient country. Conditions can therefore be viewed as the result of the 
bidding competition amongst the actors, between what the donor believes will lead to success 
of the project and on the bargaining power of the recipient country (Hernandez, 2015, p. 6). 
The conditions can be either direct or indirect. Regime theorist view donors and international 
organizations in general as sources of norms and legitimacy that can have a considerable impact 
on state behavior. They can enhance behavior, provide a venue for policy formulation, and 
transfer models of governance internationally. This can be done either by trying to convince the 
recipient countries of the rightfulness and appropriateness of particular international norms, 
here good governance, which is the value-driven approach, or by convincing recipient countries 
of adapting norms due to the rational calculation of good governance (Holmberg & Rothstein, 
2012, pp. 175-176). This approach is thus not what is usually implied when discussing 
conditionality on aid.  
Conditions are generally carried out with significant political leverage and/or 
economical recourses to ensure that states carry out reforms. Holmberg and Rothstein (2012, 
pp. 176-177) discuss the effect of conditions form international organizations on member states, 
but the principles are the same as conditions from aid donors on recipient countries. To receive 
aid, recipient countries must fulfill certain demands or conditions. The donors then can threaten 
to withdraw aid if the conditions are not met. The theoretical justification for conditions on aid 
is then that conditions, and the possibility of withdrawal of aid revenue or holding back aid 
revenue, will force recipient countries to create better governance, which in turn will lead to 
better development.  
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Collier, P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont and Gunning (1997, pp. 1400-1401) argue that 
there are various rationales for aid conditionality, and present five such objectives. Firstly, the 
donor may offer aid as an incentive for the recipient government to change its policies. This is 
the objective of inducement, namely the aim is to induce the government to do something it 
would have chosen not to do without the offer of aid. This is the dominant objective among 
Western donors. Secondly, donors can treat policies as exogenous but wish to concentrate aid 
in good policy environments. The rationales for selectivity between countries is that aid is more 
productive in a good policy environment. Donors will therefore choose to channel aid to 
countries that already have a satisfactory policy environment. Such donor behavior might 
encourage recipient countries to better their governance to receive (more) aid.  
Thirdly, the donors may want to ensure that aid funds are spent on particular goods or 
services, such as machines of a favored design or the use of enterprises from the donor country. 
This rationale may be called paternalism, and signals a disagreement between the donor and the 
government in the use of aid. As will be discussed later in the thesis, China often demands that 
recipient countries use Chinese goods and services to receive aid. Most often, donors try to 
improve aid effectiveness in raising the recipients’ welfare, by restricting the way aid is spent. 
Fourthly, aid can be used as a mechanism of commitment (“lock-in”) for government policies. 
In that case, the objective of conditionality is to provide a credible threat. In the case that aid is 
given because of a certain policy-reform, the reversal of that policy reform must lead to the 
withdrawal of aid, for this type of aid to be successful. The objective of this type of aid is 
restraint where the donor provides the recipient government with an incentive not to change a 
policy. Fifthly, the objective of aid might be signaling. For private agents, information on 
government performance might be costly, but they might find it preferable to free ride on the 
decisions of donors who are known to invest considerable recourses in monitoring government 
performance. This in turn, can reduce the private sectors decision cost, which can stimulate 
investment (Collier, et al., 1997, pp. 1400-1401). Based on the theoretical discussion above, the 
first hypothesis is the following: 
 





2.2.2. How Development Aid from DAC Donors Can Lead to Worse Governance 
 Many scholars have argued that, despite the good intentions of donors, development aid 
can lead to diminished governance in recipient countries (Ear, 2007; Knack, 2001; Abrahamsen, 
2000; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Quazi & Alam, 2015; Asongu, 2014; Tavares, 2003). These 
scholars argue that foreign aid diminishes governance in recipient countries by encouraging 
corruption and other rent seeking activities, fuels conflict between competing interest groups 
over access to aid funds, and diverts human recourses from the public sector to aid-funded 
projects (Quazi & Alam, 2015, p. 17). Knack (2001, pp. 311-312) demonstrates that despite the 
theoretical reasons to expect that development aid leads to better governance, empirical analysis 
generally concludes that development aid has a negative or non-significant effect on 
governance. The negative effect of development aid is often explained as a problem of aid 
dependence. According to Bräutigam and Knack (2004, p. 257) aid dependence is a condition 
created by, but not synonymous with, large transfers of development aid. Bräutigam and Knack 
define aid dependence as: 
“… a situation in which a government is unable to perform many of the core functions 
of a government, such as the maintenance of existing infrastructure of the delivery of 
basic public services, without foreign aid funding and expertise (provided in the form 
of technical assistance or projects).” (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, p. 257) 
 In Europe, the development of democracy and the rule of law, was to a large extent 
related to monarchs` needs for tax revenues, particularly to pay for expensive wars. The elites 
that provided the monarchs with most of this revenue, demanded accountability from 
government in return, as was the case with the Manga Carta and the Glorious Revolution in 
England. Development aid can short-circuit these processes in developing countries by 
reducing governments` dependence on its citizens for tax revenues. When countries receive 
high levels of aid, they are first and foremost accountable to the donors rather than the 
taxpayers. Thereby reducing domestic pressure for accountability. This could lead to bad 
institutions; if governments that receive large amounts of aid build institutions according to 
donor’s specifications, instead of according to domestic advance, the new institutions could 
break down if external funding ends (Knack, 2001, pp. 312-313; Ear, 2007, p. 260).  
  A good and well-functioning bureaucracy is crucial for good governance. Foreign aid 
can weaken the state bureaucracy of recipient governments. Donor organizations could draw 
scarce talent away from the civil service, by hiring the most the most skilled public officials at 
salaries much higher than those offered by the recipient`s government. In addition, foreign aid 
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can hinder local bureaucracies from developing administrative capacity. Particularly when 
donors implement projects that local governments would have undertaken anyway (Knack, 
2001, p. 313). Dollar and Pritchett (1998, p. 98) argues that donors sometimes have hindered 
the creation of effective public sectors because by implementing such projects, because it was 
the easiest way to achieve project success. Wakened state bureaucracy as a consequence of 
development aid is discussed by Braütigam and Knack (2004, p. 261), they argue that senior 
government official often spends so much time monitoring donor projects, that they do not have 
time to prioritize their own ministries.  
 Perhaps most important, foreign aid represents a potential source of rents, with 
unfortunate negative effects on the quality of the public sector and corruption. Rent-seeking 
often takes the form of increased employment in the public sector. Aid is frequently used for 
patronage activities, such as employing more people into the public sector or state-led 
enterprises. As such, foreign aid provides funds for governments to undertake investments that 
would otherwise be made by private investors. A larger public sector, creates more 
opportunities for corruption. If state-owned firms displace private investment, a weakened 
private sector produce less pressure on the government to establish accountable and transparent 
procedures and institutions (Knack, 2001, p. 313). The World Bank acknowledges that large 
increases in development aid contribute to the “opportunity of malfeasance”. In other words, 
foreign aid can strengthen the predatory power of governments, and create opportunities for 
governments to proliferate (Quazi & Alam, 2015, p. 17).  
 Development aid could also reallocate talent from productive to redistributive activities. 
As rents available for those controlling government increases, recourses devoted to obtaining 
political influence increase. Hence, the consequence of aid could be to politicize life in the 
recipient country. When aid revenues increase, workers face incentives to reallocate their time 
and knowledge towards knowledge and skills useful for obtaining a share of aid revenues, 
instead of acquiring knowledge and skills specific to manufacturing. In the private sector, this 
will lead to increased recourses allocated towards political connections and lobbying skills 
(Knack, 2001, p. 314). Increased consumption by rent-seeking groups could exceed the windfall 
revenues, so that the government recourses available for productive public spending fall. 
Greater competition between social groups could increase rent dissipation. This effect is 
especially relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of the countries are ethnically 
diverse (Gershman & Rivera, 2016, p. 1). Aid in very diverse societies often worsen corruption 
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(Knack, 2001, p. 314). In sum, development aid can lead to aid dependence, which in turn can 
have a negative effect on governance.  
 Aid dependence might not be the only reason why development aid can have a negative 
effect on governance. According to Smith (2007, p. 276), the intentions of Western donors are 
not always good. Western donors have repeatedly “ignored good governance in recipient states 
in order to pursue their own diplomatic or economic objectives” (Smith, 2007, p. 276). There 
are several reasons why aid rhetoric does not match aid patterns. Development aid is closely 
linked to foreign policy and security concerns. Bilateral aid is given more often to political 
allies and former colonies than to countries with good governance. Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith (2009, pp. 310-311) argue that all nations transfer aid according to political survival 
interest of donor and recipient government, to protect their own hold of power. In Kenya 
between 1992 and 1997, Western donors endorsed bad governance in the country. Political 
stability was preferred to good governance reforms, so that the economic changes sponsored by 
Western donors could proceed. The growth of international terrorism has also altered priorities 
of donors. After September 11, the US promised Pakistan US $ 1 billion in debt rescheduling, 
and the EU made concessions worth £950 million, despite the bad governance in Pakistan. 
Western donors needed Pakistan`s support on the war against terrorism (Smith, 2007, pp. 276-
278). How and why bilateral aid is given, can depend on the recipient relationship with the 
donor country, which in turn can affect good governance in different directions (Mesquita & 
Smith, 2009; Smith, 2007).  
 
H2: The more development aid obtained from DAC donors, the worse governance within 
developing countries. 
 
However, empirical analysis often conclude that conditioning aid on policy and 
governance reform is largely ineffective, and that external recourses can help bad as well as 
good governments survive by reducing the cost of doing nothing as well as the reducing the 
cost of reforming. By providing an alternative source of funding, aid can relieve pressure from 
governments to establish efficient policies and institutions necessary for attracting private 
capital. In that sense, how development aid effects governance, depends in the existing 
government in a country, and not on the pressure from donors (Knack, 2001, p. 312). The pre-
existing quality of governance can determine the extent to which aid undermined institutions 
(Ear, 2007, p. 263). The type of development aid given can also determine if the effect is 
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positive or negative. Based on the theoretical arguments above, it could be that the effect of 
some types of development aid are positive, and some types of development aid are negative 
for good governance. Because Western aid is defined as bilateral DAC aid, and not for example 
aid from the World bank, the different DAC donors have different . In the case that development 
aid can be both positive and negative at the same time, depending on the type of aid and the 
donor, the effect can turn out as non-significant in a statistical analysis. Bilateral aid consists of 
very different donors, despite following the DAC principles in the allocation of aid. It is 
therefore a very complex phenomenon.  
 
2.3. Chinese Development Aid 
Development aid was introduced when the West was industrialized and rich, and the 
rest of the World was either non-industrialized and poor or communist. Since the 1990s, the 
world order on which aid was based on has changed rapidly. It began with the end of the Cold 
War, then by the growth of the Asian Tigers followed by China and other emerging economies, 
primarily the BRICs – Brazil, Russia, India and China, and subsequently the financial crisis in 
the OECD countries (Eggen & Roland, 2014, pp. 86-87). Today, China is a major player on the 
African continent within trade, development aid and diplomacy – and its influence in Africa is 
growing. The intensified relationship between China and African states has been subject to 
much debate and controversy. The discussion of Chinese engagement in Africa includes the 
Chinese motivation for engagement, the official justification, the political and economic drive 
for intensifying the relationship, and the practice and possible development impact such 
cooperation has had and will have in the future in African states (Grimm, 2014, pp. 993-994). 
Beyond the quantitative impact of growing development aid from China, this engagement may 
have significant qualitative impacts on African development, both positive and negative 
(Berthelemy, 2011, p. 6).  
In the following section, I will present the theoretical and empirical background of how 
Chinese development aid might affect good governance in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
First, I will present a definition of Chinese development aid, and explain why it is difficult to 
define. Secondly, I will present the theoretical and empirical reasoning of why Chinese 
development aid can have a negative effect on good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thirdly, 
I will present the theoretical and empirical arguments of why Chinese development aid might 
have a positive effect on the quality of governance in Sub-Saharan African states.  
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2.3.1. Definition of Chinese Development Aid and China`s Official Aid Program 
 It is difficult to give a clear picture of what Chinese development aid is. Chinese 
development aid does not easily align with the standard definition of ODA as presented above. 
In China`s White Papers on foreign aid, they categorize their development aid as South-South 
cooperation. However, China does not present a clear definition of their development aid that 
can be compared to the DAC-definition (Wolf, et al., 2013, p. 4; China`s Information Office of 
the State Council, 2014). China provides five basic principles of their development aid.  
“…when providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing 
any political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient country 
and fully respecting their right to independently choosing their own paths and models 
of development. Basic principles are; mutual respect, equality, keeping promise, mutual 
benefits and win-win” (China`s Information Office of the State Council, 2014, p. 1).  
The white paper also mentions that the objectives of China`s foreign assistance are to “support 
the developing countries to reduce poverty and improve the livelihood of their peoples”. 
Further, China prioritizes supporting these countries to develop agriculture, enhance education 
level, improve medical and health services and build welfare facilities, and provide emergency 
humanitarian aid when they suffer severe disasters (China`s Information Office of the State 
Council, 2014, p. 2).  
In practice, most of Chinese development aid given trough projects, and not trough 
budget support, which is the norm of Western donors. Chinese aid projects can take different 
forms: grants in the form of social projects (health, education, housing), material assistance, 
technical assistance and personal training, interest-free loans given notably for infrastructure 
projects, concessional loans provided by China EXIM Bank, and debt relief (Berthelemy, 2011, 
p. 11). This part of Chinese aid resembles DAC aid. However, China often aid trough “package 
financing”. This means that the development finance is a mix between aid and investment, 
and/or concessional and non-concessional financing. Additionally, Chinese state-owned 
companies often blur the line between official governmental development finance and private 
flows; making is difficult to separate Chinese ODA from Chinese foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in African counties (Strange, et al., 2017, p. 5).  
Much qualitative research is done on the effect of Chinese development aid African 
countries. However, there is little reliable and comprehensive quantitative data available, 
because China does not openly disclose their development aid budgets (Strange, et al., 2017, p. 
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937). China`s resistance to aid transparency might reflect a broader disinterest in complying 
with Western (OECD-DAC) standards. Huse and Muyakwa (2008, p. 12) argue that China does 
not disclose much information about its development finance because of three simple reasons. 
Firstly, China is still a developing country, and therefore the Chinese population might object 
to China helping Africans instead of poor people in China. Secondly, China feels like it might 
be sensitive information to recipient countries, and argue that it is up to the African states 
themselves to report or not report how much aid they receive from China. Thirdly, China does 
not want African countries to compare the amounts of aid received among them. 
As the discussion above demonstrate, it is difficult to define Chinese development aid, 
because it is fundamentally different from DAC aid, and because very little official data is 
publically available. Most literature on Chinese development aid stresses that Chinese 
development aid and Chinese official investments are highly interlinked and difficult to 
separate. Therefore, I argue that Chinese development aid should be defined somewhat broader 
than DAC aid. A broader definition of Chinese development finance is common in the literature 
on Chinese development aid when comparing it to DAC aid (Tan-Mullins, et al., 2010; Kilama, 
2016; Pehnlet, 2007; Dreher & Fuchs, 2015; Wolf, et al., 2013). Chinese development aid will 
therefore be defined as Chinese development finance. Chinese development finance consists of 
the categories ODA-like, ordinary official finance-like (OOF), and vague official flows (VOF). 
The benefit of this categorization is that it explicitly accounts for the financial activities that do 
not easily fit in with the existing categorization schemes, while at the same time it can be 
compared to DAC definitions (China AidData, 2017; Dreher & Fuchs, 2015). Hence, when 
discussing “Chinese aid” in the analysis, I am referring to Chinese development finance. 
2.3.2. How Chinese Development Aid Can Lead to Worse Governance 
In the literature and discussions on Chinese development aid and governance, it is most 
often argued that Chinese development aid, or Chinese involvement, will lead to worse 
governance in developing countries. Several studies focus on the nature and quality of Chinese 
aid (Berthelemy, 2011, p. 7). The main argument of why Chinese development aid would have 
a negative effect on governance is the absence of conditionalities and the principle of non-
interference (Dreher & Fuchs, 2015, p. 995; Naím, 2007, pp. 95-96; Kilama, 2016, pp. 77-78; 
Hernandez, 2015, p. 8; Woods, 2008, pp. 1207-1208). The Chinese government emphasize that 
the Chinese approach focuses on “negotiation and dialogue, respect for sovereignty, and the use 
of tripartite mechanisms of the UN” (Woods, 2008, p. 1208).  
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By critics of Chinese development aid, the determination not to involve themselves in 
the politics of recipient countries is seen as support for rough states (Woods, 2008, p. 1207). 
The principle of non-interference proposes that China`s aid allocation should be independent 
of regime type and quality of governance in the recipient country. As such, China plays the role 
as “the dragon in the bush”, luring the weakest regimes in Africa into worsen governance, 
because Chinese foreign policy does not comply well with standards and norms set by 
traditional donors (Kilama, 2016, p. 529). By financing troubled and illegitimate governments 
in Africa, China poses a challenge to good governance. Weak regulatory economic and 
bureaucratic apparatuses in many Sub-Saharan countries make economic cooperation with 
China a possible threat (Chilieshe, 2010, p. 12). In other words, by not interfering in recipients` 
internal affairs, China is “backing corrupt elites in rough states for exploitation of rights or other 
forms access to raw materials, in the process undermining Western initiatives to fight corruption 
and enhance governance standards” (Pehnelt, 2007, p. 211). Further more, this can have 
negative effects in the development prospects in Africa, since good institutions and good 
governance is crucial for sustainable development (Pehnelt, 2007, p. 211). 
The literature contends that China`s foreign policy relies on calculated self-interest, hid 
behind a “regime-neutral” approach. As such, the Chinese leadership seeks to maintain good 
relations with whatever regime in power in any country where China has diplomatic and 
security interests of is doing business – regardless of the character of the regime. Because 
democratic systems can be complex to navigate through, it is often easier for China to do 
business with narrow authoritarian regimes. From the recipients point of view, China`s 
economic development and rapid modernization has given hope to authoritarian rulers in Africa 
(Nathan, 2016, pp. 23-24, 26). An example of this was when Angola broke of aid negotiations 
with the IMF in 2006. When Angola sought aid financing in 2006, the traditional donors would 
not hold a donor conference until Angola had presented a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
and had made a deal on corruption and economic management reform with the IMF. Angola 
was then offered a concessional loan from China, tied only to a deal with future oil suppliers. 
Angola then broke negotiations with the IMF and made a deal with China (Kjøllesdal & Welle-
Strand, 2010, p. 9). This example show both that Chinese involvement can prevent important 
good governance initiatives form traditional donors, and how China uses aid for their own 
economic gain.   
Chinese loans to African countries are a third cause of alarm, according to Western 
critics (Woods, 2008, p. 1207; Kilama, 2016; Chilieshe, 2010; Pehnelt, 2007). Many Western 
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donors have voiced concerns about possible indebtedness, if emerging donors offers new loans 
to low-income countries that have been granted debt relief by the established donors. They fear 
that China is now offering new loans to the debt-released countries, which in turn could have 
problems in the future of these countries (Woods, 2008, p. 1209). Additionally, it is expected 
that traditional donors will be less willing to engage in debt-relief in the future, when emerging 
donors are possible free-riders and cancelled debt quickly is replaced by new debt (Kjøllesdal 
& Welle-Strand, 2010, p. 10).   
The claim that China supports rough states, Wood (2008, p. 1208) argue, goes back to 
a broader critique of the Chinese economic model being transferred to African states. The fear 
is that the Beijing consensus will replace the Washington consensus5 on economic policy. If 
China exports its own economic policy model to Africa, it runs counter to the economic model 
promoted by Western donors. The argument is that development aid from emerging donors 
permits countries to put off opening the economy, and are instead offering them an artificial 
lifeline that enables the recipients to put off reforms that would bring about development 
(Woods, 2008, p. 1208). The term Beijing consensus was introduced to describe the Chinese 
development model in contrast to the Washington model. It refers partly to domestic policy 
choices, and partly to how China thinks about development in poor countries. China`s own 
success story centers on building infrastructure, upgrading agriculture, developing 
manufacturing industries and investing in education. This is exactly what China does in African 
countries. However, China does not try to export its own model or ideology, and does not 
provide policy advice. Rather, China claims that they give poor African countries the tools to 
find their own way out of poverty (Eggen & Roland, 2014, pp. 94-95).  
China does however impose some conditions on their development aid. Even though 
they do not involve themselves in the internal affair of the recipient country, China does make 
extensive use of input conditionalities, especially the tying of aid. China ties their aid by 
requiring the use of Chinese contractors and for Chinese funded projects. China also tie their 
aid by offering financial assistance and funding construction project in exchange for access to 
oil supplies. McCormick categorizes such aid as “China`s aid for oil strategy”. The only output-
condition China puts on their development aid is that aid-receiving countries must acknowledge 
                                                          
5 The Washington Consensus is a set of 10 economic policy prescriptions considered to constitute the 
standard reform package promoted for developing countries, by Washington. The economic conditions 
are broadly free market ideas, supported by prominent economics and international organizations, such 
as the IMF, the World Bank, the EU and the US (Pettinger, 2017). 
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that there is one China that encompasses mainland China and Taiwan. Hence, China does not 
give development aid to countries that recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state (McCormick, 
2008, pp. 84-85). However, these conditions are related to China`s own interests, and not their 
idea of what is best for the recipient. According to Eggen and Roland, such conditions are easily 
understood by African leaders, and preferable to Western conditions (Eggen & Roland, 2014, 
pp. 102-103). Based on the discussion above, the fourth hypothesis is the following:  
 
H3: The more development aid from China, the worse governance within developing countries.  
 
The relationship between recipient and donor in development cooperation can be 
described as  
“… a negotiation process which both sides have a set of (potentially divergent) interests 
and priorities they need to negotiate. The “competitive pressure” that new donors` 
growing presence in the aid landscape exerts on the traditional donors development 
policy regime affects the policy space of recipient governments” (Kilama, 2016, pp. 79-
80) 
As such, development aid from China could have an indirect effect on governance in the 
recipient country, by affecting how established donors condition their development aid. If 
emerging donors give development aid with fewer or no conditions, DAC donors could react 
by either propose a larger amount of conditions to address the potential macroeconomic effects 
that the availability of inexpensive lending might cause, or by asking for less reform to maintain 
competitive in the international aid-market (Hernandez, 2015, p. 9).  
 Hernandez (2015, pp. 9-10), illustrates the two options with the case of development 
aid and loans from the World Bank, which also applies for DAC aid. In the first case, new 
donors are not per se a financial alternative to development aid from the World Bank, because 
the latter does not completely satisfy the borrower`s or recipient`s demand for aid. The recipient 
will therefore use both sources of funding to support different development projects. Here, the 
World Bank can revise its conditionalities upwards to adjust for the effects of emerging donors 
on the recipient`s economy. If the new donors oppose a threat to debt sustainability, it is 
expected that the World Bank will impose stricter reforms.  
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In the second case, of imposing fewer conditions, the additional aid offered by the 
emerging donors causes a surplus in the supply of development recourses, and therefore the 
recipient countries can choose from different options to finance a project. In other words, as the 
sharpest critics of emerging donors would call it; “to shop around for donors that are soft on 
bad governance, and that are prepared to tolerate or even participate in corruption” (Naím, 
2007). In such an environment, the recipient selects the most desirable alternative and the World 
Bank might have to offer a competitive level of conditions if it is interested in keeping its 
presence in the country in question (Hernandez, 2015, p. 9). In turn, according to the argument 
of why DAC aid with conditions leads to better governance presented in 2.2.1, if DAC donors 
impose less conditions on their aid, it could lead to worse governance in developing countries6.  
Eggen and Roland (2014, pp. 99-100) agrees with Hernandez, they argue that the best 
way to understand Western skepticism with Chinese aid, is by looking at what Chinese aid 
could do to Western Aid. China offers an alternative to Western aid, and could therefore 
undermine Western aid. During the 1990`s, DAC donors were alone in providing development 
assistance to developing countries, leaving their governments with no other choice but to accept 
Western demands. A big change in development aid that has happened the last 15 to 20 years 
is that developing countries today have the option to collaborate with richer countries, such as 
China, that do not try to transform them. The emerging donors revealed the disturbing 
possibility to Western donors, that their influence over aid-receiving countries is dependent on 
Western monopoly over aid. Which could mean that the Western hegemony over aid and 
development is over. Based on the discussion above, the fifth hypothesis regarding the indirect 
effect of Chinese aid is: 
 
H4: Higher levels of Chinese aid has a negative indirect effect on the effectiveness on DAC aid 
on good governance. 
 
2.3.2. How Chinese Development Aid Can Lead to Better Governance 
Some scholars argues that the many concerns with Chinese development aid`s negative 
impact on good governance might be somewhat overrated. In addition, Chinese development 
                                                          
6 High levels of aid, channeled through governments with clear development agendas, can use aid 
funding to improve the quality of the civil service, strengthen policy and planning capacity, and 
establish strong institutions.  (Knack, 2001, p. 331; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, pp. 255-260). 
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aid might have a positive effect on good governance and development in developing countries 
(Dreher & Fuchs, 2015; Woods, 2008; Tan-Mullins, et al., 2010; Dreher, et al., 2016). The first 
explanations of why Chinese development aid might have a positive effect on good governance, 
originates from the argument on why Western aid might have a negative effect on good 
governance. As I have elaborated on earlier7, aid dependence could lead to larger bureaucracies 
and more rent-seeking activities. China mainly delivers aid trough discrete projects, which the 
Chinese control from the initial planning process until the finalization of the project. As such, 
Chinese development aid leave less space for corruption, fraud and abuse of aid funds in the 
process, and is more effective in promoting economic growth, compared to DAC donors. In 
terms of governance, some researchers are suggesting that China is more responsive to recipient 
needs and are willing to “get things done” in a timely manner, hence, they are reducing the 
administrative burden placed on overstretched public bureaucracies in the developing world 
(Dreher, et al., 2016, p. 7; Tan-Mullins, et al., 2010, pp. 860-861).  
 Secondly, a notable part of Chinese development aid is given through technical support 
and education of government officials. Higher levels of education could help build better 
bureaucracies. According to the Information Office of the State Council The People`s Republic 
of China (2011), China runs different kinds of technical training programs for government 
officials, education programs, technical training programs, and other personnel exchange 
programs for developing countries. According to the theory presented above, better education 
and training of government officials, could lead to better governance (Bräutigam & Knack, 
2004, p. 256).  China focuses on building on local capacities and needs of local governments 
when they provide development aid. 
Thirdly, despite the non-interference principle, the Chinese government should be 
interested in doing good business in African countries. According to theory, good governance 
is important for good development. Several scholars argue that this has had, and will have 
implications for Chinese development finance in the future. Grimm (2014, pp. 1000-1001) 
states that a challenge to the non-interference principle comes from domestic pressure in China. 
Chinese trade interests and investments are increasing substantially, and the stakes that Chinese 
economic actors risk are increasing. Hence, a strict hands-off attitude becomes more and more 
difficult. During the civil war in Libya in 2011, 35 860 Chinese workers were evacuated from 
the country. The evacuation was directed towards domestic politics and was meant to send a 
                                                          




signal from Beijing that they do not tolerate that Chinese citizens (and assets) were harmed 
abroad. Hence, in the longer run, China cannot escape the issue of governance, because it is an 
essential precondition for maintaining stabile economic relationships. Both Chinese companies 
and the Chinese government will need to find ways to protect their own political and economic 
investments, within an uncertain and rapidly changing Africa (Pehnelt, 2007, p. 14). The 
argument is also backed up by Tan-Mullins et.al. (2010, p. 876); China has faced challenges 
with “existing political problems in some countries either by design or by default”.  
 
H5: The more Chinese development aid, the better governance within developing countries. 
 
As with DAC aid, it could be that Chinese aid does not have an effect on good 
governance. If China gives aid to countries regardless of their quality of governance, the general 
statistical effect could be not significant, because their impact could be both positive and 
negative depending on the characteristics of the recipient country. The claim that Chinese aid 
could have both positive and negative consequences at once is supported by Varrall (2016). He 
contend that the different domestic agencies and actors on Chinese aid in China are very 
fragmented. Therefore, the effectiveness and direction of this effect depends largely on these 
actors. In October 2017, AidData released a new dataset and working paper on Chinese 
development aid globally between 2000 and 2014. Here they test whether China has a negative 
effect on the effectiveness of DAC aid with regards to economic growth. They find no support 
for the hypothesis that China has a negative effect on the effectiveness of DAC aid (Dreher, et 
al., 2017, p. 26). If this can be transferred to good governance as well, it might be the result of 
the indirect effect of China presented in H4.  
 
2.4. Chapter Summary  
 Good governance is crucial for development in all countries. Consequently, Western 
development agencies condition their development aid on good governance in recipient 
countries. However, the effects of such political conditions are debated in the literature. On the 
positive side, it is argued that development aid can foster good in recipient countries by 
strengthening domestic institutions and bureaucracy. However, large amounts of development 
aid can lead to aid dependence, which in turn has a negative effect on good governance. 
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Additionally, the intensions of DAC donors might not always be good. Hence, both theoretical 
arguments will be tested in the empirical analysis. The majority of the literature on Chinese 
development aid claim that Chinese development aid has a negative effect on governance, 
because of the principle of non-interference. Nevertheless, there are some implications in the 
literature of some positive effects of Chinese development aid on governance. Lastly, Chinese 
development aid might affect governance indirectly, by influencing how Western donors affect 




Chapter 3: Method 
 In this chapter, I will present and discuss the method that will be used to answer the 
research question. Until recently, quantitative data on Chinese aid allocations were not 
publically available. Therefore, most studies on Chinese aid are qualitative case studies 
(Strange, et al., 2015). Now that comprehensive quantitative data on Chinese development aid 
is available, it is important to fill the quantitative knowledge gap on the effect of Chinese 
development aid. The thesis will therefore explicitly use a quantitative method. First, the 
specific choice of method, namely panel data regression model, will be presented and discussed. 
Second, the estimation techniques fixed versus random effects will be discussed. In this section, 
I will demonstrate the theoretical and statistical reasons why fixed effects estimation will be 
used in the analysis. Third, the interaction term will be presented and discussed. The interaction 
term is based on the dependent hypothesis presented in chapter two. Lastly, the assumptions of 
the linear model will be discussed.  
 
3.1 Panel Data Regression Model 
 The data used in this thesis is panel data, also referred to as cross sectional times series 
or longitudinal data (Beck & Katz, 2011, p. 332; Daugherty, 2011, p. 514; Gerring, 2012, p. 
277).  In a panel dataset each unit have more than one observation and are measured at two or 
more points in time. Hence, panel data is a combination of cross sectional and times series data, 
and therefore have both the time dimension of time series and the space dimension of cross 
sectional data (Daugherty, 2011, p. 514). The time dimension in panel data enables me to study 
the change in the (individual) level of units (Andreβ, et al., 2013, p. 2). Because the same units 
are measured at several pints in time, panel data can be understood as a non-randomized 
research design. Therefore, “the absence of a manipulable treatment means that the mode 
complex of these designs are very unlikely to appear naturally” (Gerring, 2012, pp. 279-280). 
This means that the application of a panel data regression analysis is more complex. However, 
panel data are increasingly being used in the social sciences, especially within comparative 
political economy (Beck & Katz, 2011, p. 332).  
As I am interested in studying how Chinese development aid affects changes in good 
governance, and not merely if it is significantly correlated with good governance, a panel data 
regression model is the most suitable method to answer the research question. The dataset used 
32 
 
in this thesis8 contains annual information from 2000 until 2013. The units are countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The dataset that will be used have several missing observations, making the 
panel unbalanced.  
 There are many reasons for the increased interest in panel data analysis in the social 
sciences. An important reason is that panel data might offer a solution to the problem of omitted 
variable bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity. If there is unobserved heterogeneity present, 
it breaks the key assumption that the independent variables are not correlated to the error term 
(Daugherty, 2011, p. 514; Aneshensel, 2013, p. 91). This will be further elaborated on in the 
section on estimation technique9. Secondly, panel data can uncover dynamics that are hard to 
detect with cross sectional data. Panel data allow for observation of the effect of the variables 
at different points in time, which will make the results more robust and decrease the likelihood 
of spurious correlation (Daugherty, 2011, p. 515).  
Thirdly, panel datasets usually have very large number of observations. If there are n 
units of observation and if the survey is undertaken in T time periods, there are potentially nT 
observations consisting of time series of length T on n parallel units (Daugherty, 2011, pp. 514-
515). The increased number of observations is especially important for studies of countries in 
political science, as the number of countries in the World is just above 200 (Daugherty, 2011, 
p. 525). If I were to use cross sectional data to analyze the research question, I would only have 
47 countries with one observation per variable. However, because I use panel data from 2000 
to 2013 (14 years) I have potentially have 65810 observations in my dataset, despite a relatively 
low number of countries. Panel data therefore covers two dimensions two dimensions, namely 
time and space.  
 
3.2. Fixed Effects versus Random Effects Estimation  
 The two main approaches to the fitting of models using panel data are known as fixed 
effects regressions and random effects regressions. The choice of estimation technique depends 
on the unobserved effects in panel data models (Daugherty, 2011, p. 518). Fixed effects models 
estimate the intercept term of each individual group unit. As such, each individual has its own 
individual characteristics that may or may not influence the independent variables. Fixed effects 
                                                          
8 See chapter 4 for information on the dataset and variables used in the thesis.  
9 See section of fixed and random effects 
10 T*n=N or 14*47 = 658 
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estimation is referred to as the “within-group regression model”. In fixed effects models, we 
assume that there is something within each country that may influence or bias the independent 
variables. Fixed effects estimation controls for this by removing the independent variables that 
does not vary over time. Fixed effects estimation is attractive because it is simplicity, and 
because it tackles unobserved heterogeneity bias. This is one of the biggest advantages with 
fixed effects estimation, because quantitative research is often criticized for leaving out 
important independent variables. Because the fixed effects model only analyze what causes 
change in the dependent variable within units over time11, the problem is solved. Variables that 
do not change over time (such as institutions) cannot cause change over time unless they change 
over time as well. Whatever effect these variables have at one point in time is the same as they 
have at other points in time (Williams, 2015, p. 6; Daugherty, 2011, pp. 518-519).  
 If one is interested in variables that do not vary over time, fixed effects is not an effective 
tool because such variables are omitted. When the between-unit variation is greater than the 
within-unit variation, the standard errors of a fixed effects model might be too large to tolerate 
(Williams, 2015, p. 9). Random effects estimation is often considered more attractive compared 
to fixed effects estimation, because the characteristics that remain constant for each country are 
retained in the regression model (Daugherty, 2011, p. 525). In political science variables that 
do not change over time, such as political system, colonial legacy, and geography, are often of 
great theoretical value. However, to use a random effects estimation, none of the preconditions 
can be violated.  
The first precondition is that the observations are randomly drawn from a given 
population. Daugherty (2011, p. 525) states that a panel data consisting of only the OECD 
countries would not be a random sample of the 200-something countries in the World. As I am 
interested in how Chinese development aid affects good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
first precondition is broken. Ideally, missing values should be missing completely at random. 
This precondition is often difficult in most research in social science, because countries with 
missing values are likely to be different from countries without missing values (Acock, 2014, 
p. 395). The data at hand do suffer from missing variables, especially on the variables on 
Chinese development aid. The reason why there is much missing data on Chinese development 
aid is because it is not publically available and because some countries might be more and some 
                                                          
11 Here: if Chinese development aid change the level of good governance within Sub-Saharan African 
countries over time 
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less open on the amount of aid they receive from China. Hence, the openness of the country in 
question is important for the number of missing values (Daugherty, 2011, p. 525).  
The second precondition is that the unobserved effect be distributed independently of 
the Xj variables. This might be tested with a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test. The test 
determines whether the estimates of the coefficients, taken as a group, are significantly different 
in the two regressions. If the null-hypothesis of the DWH-test is rejected fixed effects 
estimation should be used, and if the null-hypothesis is not rejected, random effects should be 
used. The DWH-test is highly significant at a 1 percent level for both models. Because the null-
hypothesis is rejected12, and the observations are not a random sample of a given population, 
fixed effects estimation will be used in the regression models (Park, 2011, p. 12; Daugherty, 
2011, pp. 525-127).  
In this analysis, it is the general effect of Chinese aid on good governance within 
countries over time that is of interest. Therefore, using fixed effects lies in the nature of the 
research question. The theoretical framework suggests that both Chinese and DAC donors are 
selective when providing aid, DAC donors prefer countries with better governance and China 
prefer countries with worse governance. The focus of the thesis is not on variation between 
countries. As such, it is expected that quality of governance and the amount of development aid 
from DAC donors and China vary between countries. However, given this variation, what is 
the general effect of Chinese aid and DAC aid on good governance over time? Hence, keeping 
the variation between countries constant with fixed effects is preferred.  
 
3.3. Interaction Effects 
 In political science, conditional hypotheses are quite common because contextual 
factors are important. An interaction effect is present when the effect of an independent variable 
(x) on the dependent variable (y), depends on the values of a third variable (z) (Midtbø, 2012, 
p. 136; Allison, 1999, pp. 166-167). Brambor, Clark and Golner (2006, p. 64) argue that 
political scientist should use interaction models whenever the hypothesis they want to test is 
conditional in nature. As I have argued in the thesis, it is theoretical reason to believe that the 
effect of DAC aid (X) on good governance (Y) varies depending on level of Chinese 
development aid (Z). In other words, if traditional donors react to the presence of emerging 
                                                          
12 Chi2 = 0.000  
35 
 
donors by imposing fewer conditions on their development aid, Chinese development aid could 
indirectly affect good governance: Chinese aid negatively affect the effectiveness of DAC aid.  
  A model including an interaction term should not be read the same way as a model 
without an interaction term. First, the interaction term does not distinguish between the 
independent variable and the intervening variable13. Practically, this means that we do not know 
if it is the independent variable that is moderating the interacting variable or if it is the other 
way around (Allison, 1999, p. 168; Midtbø, 2012, p. 136). For the interaction term in this thesis, 
there is a possibility that it is DAC aid that influences Chinese aid`s effect on good governance. 
We cannot statistically rule out this reverse causation. Again, this example show how important 
it is that the model is theory based14 (Aneshensel, 2013, p. 32).  
 Second, a significant interaction term can be difficult to interpret. Allison (1999, p. 168) 
explains that this is because the main effect in a model with an interaction term indicate the 
effect when the interacting effects has the value 0. Because the value of 0 does not make sense 
for all variables it might suggest a “ridiculous relationship”. In a model with an interaction term, 
it is important to remember that it is not the constituting variables that are of interest but the 
interaction term. However, it is important to include the constituting variables in the model, 
because they play an important role in generating the correct preconditions for the dependent 
variable (Allison, 1999, p. 168; Acock, 2014, p. 305). The coefficients of the constituting 
variables are used to calculate the intervening effect. A linear regression model15 asserts that X 
has a constant effect on Y, while in an interaction model the effect of a change in X on Y 
depends on the value of the conditioning variable Z (Brambor, et al., 2006, p. 73). Therefore, 
the effect of DAC aid on QOG will be measured at different levels of Chinese development aid.  
  
3.4 Regression Assumptions and Robustness 
The validity of a regression model is dependent on the degree the regression 
assumptions are fulfilled. If any of the assumptions are not met, the regression will be biased 
                                                          
13 When creating an interaction term in Stata, the two variables of interest are multiplied with each 
other. Hence, making is impossible to distinguish between the two (Midtbø, 2012, pp. 136-137).  
14 Because I am interested in the effect of Chinese aid as the intervening variable, I will only calculate 
the effect of different levels of Chinese aid on the effect of DAC aid on QOG, not the effect of DAC 
aid as the intervening variable. 
15 The models excluding the interaction term are linear regressions, but the presence of an interaction 
term makes the model non-linear.  
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and is could lead to less robust or wrong conclusions. However, some of the assumptions are 
more important than the others. The five assumptions for a linear regression model are that the 
model is linear in its parameter, that the independent variables are independent of the error term, 
that the model is homoscedastic, uncorrelated error term, normal distribution and 
multicollinearity (Daugherty, 2011, pp. 159-191; Allison, 1999, pp. 122-123).  
 In a panel data regression model violations of the assumption of an uncorrelated error 
term is very common. This means that the error term is correlated with itself. The logical 
explanation is that the same units are being measured at different points in time. The value on 
a variable at a point in time is usually similar to the value on the same variable at a different 
point in time, especially the values close in time (Midtbø, 2012, p. 112). If the observations 
were randomly collected from a given population, there would most likely not be a problem 
with autocorrelation. However, the very core of panel data is that the observations are not 
collected randomly. They are collected form the same units form the year before (Daugherty, 
2011, p. 393). For example, the level of GDP in any country in any year will be closely related 
to the level of GDP the previous year. Because the dataset I use is panel data, all the variables 
in the analysis are likely to suffer from autocorrelation. Autocorrelation is overall more likely 
to be a problem when the interval between observations are shorter, and less likely if they are 
longer. In the dataset used in this thesis the intervals are yearly observations. In panel data, the 
most common form of autocorrelation is first-order autoregressive autocorrelation (AR (1)) 
(Daugherty, 2011, pp. 329-430).  
It is important to underline that there are some challenges with regression diagnostics. 
The first is that testing for violations of one assumption could be affected by another violation. 
As such, it could be difficult to separate the violations of the different assumptions, because 
when we solve a violation of one assumption, it will affect other assumptions. Secondly, it is 
easier to discover violations in larger selections, than in small, despite the fact that violations 
often have bigger consequences in smaller selections. The regression diagnostics cannot replace 
a rigorous theory-based analysis. As such, the first regression diagnostics can be said to be the 
choices and discussions about theory, and the variables selected in the next chapter (Midtbø, 
2012, pp. 105-106; Aneshensel, 2013, pp. 20-22). How the final model fulfill the regression 
assumptions and the challenges regarding the regression assumptions is elaborated on in chapter 
five.  
There may be a number of possible estimators, a number of plausible specifications for 
each statistical models and so on. Additionally, there can be issues of conceptualization and 
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measurement of the variables in the models. Each of the choices made are likely to influence 
the estimates of the causal effect. Some choices can affect the magnitude and/or the direction 
of the coefficients (positive/negative), or the acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Unfortunately, a theory-based analysis is not enough to resolve many of these issues, this is 
especially important if the theory is weak (Gerring, 2012, p. 319). The theoretical framework 
for my thesis is not per say weak, but theory on the effect of development aid and Chinese 
development aid is conflicting. Therefore, it is important to check for the robustness of the 
results16, by altering various elements in the analysis. The purpose of robustness checks is to 
test how precise a given estimate is in the face of different assumptions. If all plausible 
robustness tests have little impact on the findings in a model, then the model has high level of 
certainty. If the model is sensitive to small changes in the model, however, the level certainty 
is lower (Gerring, 2012, pp. 319-320). 
Following the main results, the robustness of the models will be tested by running the 
regressions with different modifications. The first modification is to change the 
operationalization of Chinese development aid from number of Chinese aid projects to Chinese 
projects as share of GDP in recipient country. Secondly, the variable political stability will be 
excluded from the model because of its high correlation with the dependent variable. Lastly, 
GDP per capita will be exchanged with GNI per capita. The robustness of the models will also 
be discussed on the relation to the regression assumption. Each regression assumption will be 
thoroughly elaborated on, and I will demonstrate how the models are modified to account for 
possible violations of the assumptions. 
3.5. Regression Models  
The regression models in the analysis report the effect of different variables on quality 
of government. The regression tables in chapter five include the coefficient of the independent 
variables and the standard error in parenthesis. The stars to the right of the parenthesis represent 
the level of significance of the variables. One star indicate that the results are significant on a 1 
percent level, two stars indicate significance at a 5 percent level and one star indicate 
significance at a 10 percent level. The closer the p-value is to zero, the higher is the probability 
that the effect is not random. The standard level to reject the null hypothesis  is at 5 percent in 
a two-tailed test to avoid committing a type one error (Daugherty, 2011, pp. 38-41). Because 
the effect of aid on good governance can be both positive and negative according to theory, I 
                                                          
16 The robustness of the model also means the strength of the model.  
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will use a two-tailed test in all models. (Daugherty, 2011, p. 38). In the analysis, the different 
levels of significance will be commented on.  
 In the analysis, two models using fixed effects estimation will be compared with 
different modifications. Model 1 will test the effect of Chinese aid and DAC aid on QOG and 
Model 2 will include the interaction term. It is important to note that the results in Model 2 must 
be interpreted in a specific way. The coefficient of the variables constituting the interaction 
term report the effect of when the variable has the value 0. To interpret the coefficients of the 
variables, the coefficients of the interaction term needs to be multiplied with Chinese 




                                                          




Chapter 4: Data and Variable Description 
 
 In this chapter, I will present a description and an overview of the dataset and variables 
employed in my thesis. To answer the research question, it is necessary to operationalize 
theoretical concepts to measurable data. I will demonstrate how the variables are measured, and 
discuss the validity between the theoretical phenomenon I want to measure, and the actual 
measurement. The dataset I use in my analysis, is a combination between the award winning 
Quality of Government standard dataset (QOG) and AidData`s recently released dataset on 
Chinese development aid.  
4.1. The Dataset 
 The QOG standard dataset contains the majority of the variables needed for the analysis. 
This dataset is used by various scholars in different fields, and is of high quality. The dataset 
originally consists of 2500 variables from more than 100 data sources. The dataset contains 
several variables measuring the same concept. As such, I can easily compare variables and 
choose the best fitting operationalization of the concepts and phenomena presented in the 
theoretical chapter. Another advantage with the QOG dataset is that it is created by the institute 
of the scholars behind the operationalization of good governance as quality of government. The 
operationalization of the dependent variable is therefore the variable recommended by the 
creators of the concept. The dependent variable will as a result be of high validity. All variables 
except the variable on Chinese development aid are collected from the QOG dataset.  
The second dataset is AndData`s “Chinese Official Finance in Africa 1.2.”, from the 
projects “Tracking Chinese Development Finance” and “Tracking Underreported Financial 
Flows”. AidData has created “an innovative, open-source methodology to provide a more 
complete picture of non-DAC development finance activities” (AidData TUFF, 2017; China 
AidData, 2017). The data is new and a pioneer within data collection on aid from emerging 
donors, especially China. As mentioned, China does not release any information on their 
development finance, therefore there are some problems of validity in the data. However, the 
dataset is the most comprehensive and detailed source of China`s development footprint in 
Africa ever assembled18 (AidData TUFF, 2017; China AidData, 2017). The latest version 
contains information on Chinese development finance to Africa from year 2000 to 2013. The 
                                                          
18 A new version of the dataset, containing more data from 2000-2014 and Chinese development aid 
globally, was released in October 2017. However, the release came too late in the process for me to 
change dataset.   
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analysis will therefore be restricted to this period. The geographical distribution of the dataset 
show that China`s activities are spread all over the African continent. The only countries that 
do not show up among China`s recipients are the countries that recognize Taiwan (Strange, et 
al., 2017, p. 25). After merging19 the variables I will use form the two datasets, 47 Sub-Saharan 
countries20 and 658 country-years remain (Teorell b), et al., 2017; China AidData, 2017). 
 
4.2. The Dependent variable: Quality of Government 
 As argued in the theoretical chapter, the definition of good governance is that of QOG. 
As such, it is natural to choose the variable on QOG that is recommended by the scholars behind 
the concept. The variable on QOG is therefore collected form the QOG dataset, which in turn 
has collected the data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Because the variable 
is coded by ICRG experts, there could be some problems with the validity of the data. 
According to Goertz (2006, pp. 95-96), the degree of faithfulness of a measure of a concept “is 
the degree to which the numeric measure matches the structure of the theoretical concept”. 
Additionally, how different coders choose to code and interpret the measure is connected to 
their own interpretation of the concept. Hence, different coders might have different views of 
how to code a country, despite having the same coding scheme. How a country is categorized 
is therefore dependent on the individual coder. In regards to reliability, I will argue that the 
variable is highly reliable, because the data is openly available and therefore easy to replicate.  
In addition to the scholars behind the concept of QOG, several scholars studying good 
governance and development aid use the quality of government variable from ICRG (Bräutigam 
& Knack, 2004; Knack, 2001; Dahlberg, et al., 2017; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). Bräutigam 
and Knack (2004, p. 266) argue that the among the various indicators of quality of government 
or good governance used in empirical research on development, the ICEG data are unique in 
covering the majority of African countries over a relatively long period of time. Hence, the 
variable is very good for the purpose of this thesis. The data is converted into a scale from 0 to 
                                                          
19 The two datasets have been merged using the “merge 1:1” command in Stata (Midtbø, 2012, pp. 52-
53) 
20 The remaining countries in the analysis are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, DR Congo, Cote d`Ivore, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, São Tome e Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan (-
2011), Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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1, by the creators of the QOG-dataset, where higher values indicate higher quality of 
government. (Teorell, et al., 2017, p. 375). Because it can be more difficult to read the 
regression models when the values on the dependent variable are so low, I have multiplied the 
variable with 100. 0 is now representing the lowest level of quality of governance, and 100 
represents the highest level of quality of government. The dependent variable contains 31 
countries and 432 observations, and the overall mean is 36.55, with a standard deviation of 
11.79. The overall mean indicates that the countries in question on a general basis suffer from 
low quality of governance. The QOG variable is the mean value of the ICRG variables 
“Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucratic Quality” (Dahlberg, et al., 2017; Teorell b), 
et al., 2017). I will now present the definitions of the three components of quality of governance.  
Corruption  
This is an assertion of corruption within a political system. Such corruption is a threat 
to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it 
reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of 
power trough patronage rather than ability; and it introduces inherent stability into the political 
process. Even though the measure take financial corruption into account, it is more concerned 
with accrual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, “favors-for-favors”, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between 
politics and business. According to ICRG, these forms of corruption are potentially of much 
greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and 
inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market. 
The greatest risk of such corruption is that in the worst-case scenario, it will lead to overthrow 
of the government, a major reorganizing of restructuring of the country’s political institution, 
or, a breakdown of law and order, rendering the country ungovernable (Teorell, et al., 2017, pp. 
375-376).  
Law and Order  
 Law and order are originally assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising 
zero to three pints. Law is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, 
and order is an assessment of popular observance of the law. In that case, a country can score 
high on law, but low on order if it has a very high crime rate or if the law is routinely ignored 
without effective sanction.  
Bureaucratic Quality  
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The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock or absorber 
that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. High points are given to 
the bureaucracy that has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy 
or interruptions in policy or interruptions in government services. In these countries, the 
bureaucracy tends to be autonomous from political pressure and to have established 
mechanisms for recruitment and training. Countries with low points tend to lack the good 
effects of a strong bureaucracy, because a change of government tends to be dramatic in terms 
of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions. (Teorell, et al., 2017, pp. 376-
377).   
4.2. Focal Independent Variables 
4.2.1. Chinese Development Aid 
 The variables on Chinese development aid are collected from AidData`s project 
“Tracking Chinese Development Finance”, and the research release dataset “Chinese Official 
Finance in Africa 1.2”. The dataset encompasses 14 years of Chinese development aid, from 
year 2000 to 2013. The research community and policy community have not been able to align 
on how to operationalize Chinese development aid in a way that make it possible to compare it 
with DAC aid. To compromise for this, AidData has complied a database of thousands of media 
reports on Chinese finance abroad in Africa from year 2000 to 2013. They have categorized 
Chinese financial flows into eleven flow categories, where three of the categories falls within 
the category of Chinese development finance, namely ODA-like aid OFF-like aid and vague 
official finance (VOF)21. The three categories represent non-investment official financing from 
China to Africa, regardless of its developmental, commercial or representational intent. The 
benefit of this categorization is that it explicitly accounts for the financial activities that do not 
easily fit in with the existing categorization schemes, while at the same time it can be mapped 
back to onto the DAC definitions (China AidData, 2017).   
 Chinese development aid is operationalized as “the number of Chinese projects 
implemented or completed per year per country”. The projects account for Chinese 
development finance. In the original dataset, each variable represent one project. The project 
variable has been summarized so each country has one observation per year. I will illustrate this 
with an example from the data. In the original dataset, Botswana had 18 observations with the 
                                                          
21 Vague official flows are flows that are either ODA-like or OOF-like, but where there is insufficient 
information to assign the flow to either ODA-like or OOF-like category.  
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value 1 in the 2003 time-period. After summarizing the project observations in 2003, Botswana 
now has one observation in 2003 with the value 18. It is important to note that in the dataset, 
some country-years have many projects and some country-years does not have any projects. 
This does not necessarily mean that a project only lasted a year, but it measures when the project 
was implemented or completed in that year. 
 The dataset is based on media based data collection, and not official data on aid 
allocations from the Chinese government, therefore, the data do suffer from validity-problems 
(Strange, et al., 2015, pp. 15-17). The creators of the dataset claim to measure Chinese aid, but 
because the data  In the robustness test of the main model, I will therefore run a model where 
the variable on Chinese aid is “Chinese development aid as share of gross domestic product in 
the recipient country per year. This is the standard way to operationalize development aid, and 
how DAC aid is operationalized. The alternative definition of Chinese aid is included because 
a large amount of projects does not necessarily come with a big sum of money attached. As a 
result, it is not possible to say anything about the size of the project. In the original dataset on 
Chinese aid, the unit of analysis is “project”22 and each project variable has a monetary sum 
connected to the project. In the same way as in the project variable, the monetary variable is the 
sum of the projects in a given year, in 2011 US dollars. This variable is useful for comparison 
with DAC aid. However, many of the projects do not have a monetary amount attached due to 
lack of information of the given project23. Hence, the project variable contains more 
observations than the monetary variable. Both variables on Chinese development aid are 
logarithmically transformed in the final models, due to problems of heteroscedasticity and 
extreme values24.  
4.2.2. OEDC-DAC Aid 
 The variable on Western aid or OECD-DAC aid is from the QOG standard dataset. The 
variable is again collected from the research release AidData 3.0 by QOG. The variable 
                                                          
22 AidData does not track disbursements of Chinese official financing. However, they write in their 
users-guided that users may use the status variable to classify projects that have been implemented or 
completed, as disbursements of Chinese official financing (China AidData, 2017). 
23 If the monetary observation connected to a project-variable is missing, it has the value 0 or are 
coded as missing. I have coded the monetary observation as missing is it has the value 0. This is 
because a value of 0 will affect the average. A project is never without money attached, hence, a value 
of 0 indicates a missing value.  
24 This is elaborated on in Chapter 5. 
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measures the sum of commitments25 [sum of development aid] received from donors not 
including international organizations. Aid commitments are commonly used in aid budget and 
in aid allocation studies, because donors exert full control only over commitments, while aid 
disbursements also depend on the recipient countries and implementing organizations. The 
variable is has both high validity and high reliability because it is based on open access data, 
and the official numbers are granted from the donor governments themselves (Teorell b), et al., 
2017).  
Such a general definition of development aid has been criticized. As mentioned in the 
literature, some scholar argue that when looking at the effect of aid on governance one have to 
look at the aid that goes specifically to good governance projects. There are several reasons 
why this is not done here. Firstly, much development aid not directly aimed at bettering good 
governance does have conditions on good governance attached. Secondly, aid that is aimed at 
other parts of society could have an indirect effect on good governance (Smith, 2007, pp. 9-10). 
By only focusing on development aid aimed at good governance, the effects of other types of 
aid could be overlooked and create biased results. Thirdly, it is a much used measurement in 
quantitative development aid research. It is of high validity and good for comparison (Tierney, 
2011). Fourthly, it is difficult to obtain detailed disaggregated data on development from the 
DAC donors. I will therefore argue that for the purpose of this thesis, a wide definition is 
necessary.  
 In the models, DAC aid will be operationalized as share of GDP of the recipient country 
per year. To measure development aid as share of GDP or GNP is the standard 
operationalization in the literature (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; 
Kilama, 2016; Bone, 1996; Strange, et al., 2015). The variable is measured as percentage of 
GDP because the data on GDP has more observations than GNP in the QOG standard dataset 
(Teorell b), et al., 2017). The GDP variable is collected form UN Statistics (Teorell, et al., 2017, 
                                                          
25 These data include commitments of the form: subsidies, loans at favorable rates to multilateral 
agencies; development loans at the market rate; technical assistance; programs of transferred 
assistance by sector in the form of money or in kind and some capital investment activities. It is worth 
noting that the following is not considered foreign aid: military equipment and service; military debt 
stocks; credit for export support or trade financing; loan guarantees; flows of aid from NGOs, loans 
from funds held in the recipient country; foreign direct investment (FDI), bank loans without 
guarantees, portfolio investments and financing contributions from multilateral development 




p. 577). The variable is logarithmically transformed in the final models, due to problems of 
heteroscedasticity and extreme values26.  
 
4.3. Control variables 
4.3.1. Level of Economic Development: GDP Per Capita 
Higher economic development is often mentioned in the literature as having a positive 
impact on good governance. Countries with a higher level of economic development tend to 
have a higher level of good governance (Pere, 2015, p. 35). The measure of level of economic 
development in the thesis will be Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. This is a common 
operationalization of economic development in the literature (Pere, 2015; Knack, 2001). I will 
argue that GDP per capita is a better measure of economic development than similar measures, 
such as annual GDP or annual growth in GDP. This is because the countries I analyze, Sub-
Saharan African countries, on average have a low GDP per capita (Knack, 2001). GDP makes 
it hard to compare countries in a substantial way, because large countries most often have a 
higher GDP than smaller countries. Despite a country having a high annual growth, such a 
measure cannot say anything about how poor or rich a country is. GDP per capita, on the other 
hand, gives a substantial measure of level of economic development, because it takes into 
consideration the size of the population. Additionally, GDP per capita makes comparison across 
countries and years more accessible. Empirical evidence generally concludes that GDP per 
capita is strongly positively correlated with good governance. I therefore expect that higher 
GDP per capita will correlate positively with good governance in the models.  
Data on GDP per capita is collected form the QOG dataset, which in turn have gathered 
their data from Gleditsch´s “Expand Trade and GDP” dataset. GDP per capita is measured in 
constant US dollars in 2005 (Teorell, et al., 2017, pp. 311-312). In the regression models, the 
variable is log-transformed to account for non-linearity and skewedness. Logging of GDP 
variables is a common treatment in the literature (Pere, 2015, p. 35; Daugherty, 2011, pp. 196-
197). The original variable was first transformed to measure an increase in 100 US dollars 
instead of an increase in 1 dollar, before the log-transformation. Alternatively, the variable 
could have been transformed into a categorical variable accounting for high, medium and low 
GDP per capita, or a dummy variable. However, this does not comply well with the empirical 
                                                          
26 This is elaborated on in Chapter 3. 
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data. Despite there being differences in GDP per capita in the countries in the analysis, most of 
the countries are poor, and have a low GDP per capita compared to the rest of the World (World-
Bank, 2017).  
4.3.2. Democracy 
Theoretically, it is often argued that democracy and good governance goes hand in hand. 
Democracy foster good governance and good governance foster democracy (Kraay, et al., 
1999). Therefore, it is important to control for democracy in the model. Avoiding to control for 
democracy could bias the regression results. Because many definitions of good governance27 
include features of democracy and the other way around, the variables tend to be highly 
correlated. It does not seem to be a big problem with my data28. I expect that being a democracy 
has a positive effect on good governance.  
The Quality of Government dataset contains a variable on democracy, that combines 
Polity IVs measure of democracy from -10 to 10, and Freedom House`s democracy scale from 
1 to 7. The original variable on democracy is on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is least democratic 
and 10 is most democratic. The version I will use has imputed values for countries where data 
on Polity is missing, by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure (Teorell, et 
al., 2017, p. 291). The scale is divided into three intervals according to degree of democracy; 0 
– 3.33, 3.34 – 6.67, and 6.68 – 10. Hence, countries with a score of 6.68 and above are 
democracies. Because I am interested in controlling whether being a democracy or not has an 
effect on good governance, I create a dummy from this variable. A country is coded as non-
democracy and has the value 0 if its original value was between 0 and 6.67. A country is coded 
as a democracy and has the value 1 if its original value was between 6.68 and 10 (Dahlberg, et 
al., 2017; Bone, 1996).  
4.4.5. Population size 
Countries with larger populations have a larger tax revenue that may decrease the 
importance of development aid. Therefore, countries with larger populations might be less 
affected by development aid. In Sub-Saharan Africa, populations are growing at a fast rate. In 
countries with bad governance, they might not have the resources to tackle a growing 
population. The is a broad consensus in the literature that population size and growth does have 
an effect on institutional settings. In countries with poor policy environments, rapid population 
                                                          
27 See 2.1.1. Definition of Good Governance 
28  The correlation between democracy and QOG is 0.17. See correlation matrix in Appendix.  
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growth can constrain economic growth (Gupta, et al., 2011, p. 1; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, 
pp. 267-268). As such, Population may affect the level of QOG in a country.  
The variable on population is collected from the QOG dataset, which in turn has 
gathered the data on population size from Gleditsch`s Expand Trade and GDP Data. The 
variables measures the size of population in 1000`s. The variable contains information on 46 
countries in Africa and 552 observations. The variables only contains data from 2000 until 
2011, it has data on all countries in the dataset except Sudan, compared to other population 
variables with several missing countries (Dahlberg, et al., 2017, p. 312).  
4.4.6. Development: Infant Mortality 
 Infant mortality is a much used indicator of health in developing countries, but it can 
also measure the capacity of a country to offer basic services. Infant mortality is repeatedly 
used as a control variable in econometric analyses on development aid and good governance 
(Knack, 2001, p. 317; Kotsadam, et al., 2017). The chance that an infant makes it to their first 
birthday depends on a variety of direct and indirect determinations; socioeconomic conditions 
like household poverty, infrastructure, sanitation, clean water, and the education of the parents, 
in particular the mother (Kotsadam, et al., 2017). Infant mortality is therefore a good 
operationalization of development in a country that is not necessarily economic29. 
The variable on infant mortality is from the QOG dataset, which in turn have gathered 
the variable form the World Bank and the World Wide Governance Indicators. Infant mortality 
rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1000 live births in a 
given year (Teorell b), et al., 2017, pp. 598,658).  
  
                                                          
29 Here HDI would also have been a good operationalization of development. However, the variable 
on HDI has a high number of missing countries, which would have affected the analysis. Therefore, 
infant mortality is used instead. 
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2Table 4.1. Variable Description  





ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government. 
0= lowest QOG, 1= highest QOG. 
Min/max year: 2000/2013 
N: 31 n:432  
International Country 





Development Aid  
Number of Chinese development finance 
projects per country-year (logged) 
Min/max year: 2000/2013 
N: 44 n: 467  
AidData: Strange 
et.al. 2017  
OECD DAC Aid Sum of commitments received from donors 
(not including international organizations). 
(% of GDP) (logged) 
Min/max year: 2000/2013 
N: 46 n: 641 







GDP per capita (constant prices, 2005 US$) 
(logged) 
Min/max year: 2000/2011 
N: 46 n: 552 
Expand Trade and 
GDP Data: QOG 
(gle_rgdpc) 
Democracy Ranges democracy on a score from 0 (least 
democratic) to 10 (most democratic). 
Dummy variable (>0.67=democracy, 
<0.67=non-democracy) 
Min/max year: 2000/2013 
N:47 n: 644 
Combination of 
Polity and Freedom 
House: QOG 
(fh_ipolity2) 
Political stability Ranges political stability between -2.5 and 
2.5 (higher scores indicate better outcomes) 
Min/max year: 2000/2013 





Population Size Size of population in 1000`s  
Min/max year: 2000/2011 
N: 46 n: 552 
Gleditsch: QOG  
(gle_pop) 
Infant Mortality Mortality rate of infants dying before the 
age of 1 year, per 1000 live births. 
Min/max year: 2000/2013 








4.5. Descriptive Characteristics of the Data 
 The descriptive characteristics of my data are presented in table 4.1. Because my data 
are panel data, I use a special command in Stata that reports the within and between standard 
deviation of the variables (xtsum). This command gives more information than the regular 
summary command in Stata, because it allows us to see the ratio of within and between variance 
in the independent, and control variables.  
3Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
Variable Observations Countries Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
QOG (DV) 432 31 36.553 11.792 8.33 66.66 
Chinese pro. (log) 467 44 1.8587 .7222 .6931 4.5643 
DAC/GDP (log) 641 46 1.6178 1.2130 -3.0123 4.7610 
GDP per capita (in 
100 $) (log) 
552 46 2.6976 .9257 .6881 5.3192 
Democracy 
(dummy) 
644 47 .3602 .4804 0 1 
Population (in 1000) 552 46 16077.13 24768.08 77 162470.7 
Political Stability 598 47 -.5538 .9636 -3.3239 1.1923 
Infant Mortality 
(per 1000 born) 
644 47 68.342 25.78 12.1 143.3 
 
The summary of regular characteristics above shows that most variables have a high 
amount of observations. However, the dependent variable QOG is missing a higher number of 
observations compared to the rest of the variables. As the number of countries show, the missing 
observations are a cause of missing counters. The QOG variables only contain observations on 
31 countries, compared to over 40 countries in the rest of the variables. The high number of 
missing values on the dependent variable can have an impact on the analysis. The mean value 
of QOG is only 36.55, with a standard deviation of 11.79. This indicates that the countries in 
general have very low quality of governance. If the same study had been done in a cross 





4Table 4.3. Within and Between Variation 




QOG  11.506 3.227 
Chinese projects (log) .3650 .6195 
DAC/GDP (log) 1.0698 .5883 
GDP per capita (in 100 $) (log) .9191 .1703 
Democracy (dummy) .4889 .222 
Population (in 1000) 24889.7 2515.502 
Political Stability .9158 .3371 
Infant Mortality (per 1000 born) 23.47 10.63 
  
Table 3.2. shows that the majority of the variables, the variation is greater between 
countries than within countries. On the dependent variable, the standard deviation within 
countries is only 3.227, while the between standard deviation is 11.506. At first glance, it seems 
that it would be more interesting to run a model with random effects estimation. However, 
demonstrated in chapter three, the data is not suitable for random effects estimation. In addition, 
the focus of the thesis is not on the difference between countries, but on the average effect that 
China has over time on QOG. Therefore, it is the variations within countries when the variables 
that do not change over time are held constant that is of interest. The variable on Chinese 
development aid vary more within than between countries. The logical explanation is that both 
variables represent Chinese development aid projects, and not the flow of aid funds. Hence, 
some country-years have many projects, and some have none or very few.  
The variable on population has a high degree of variation within and between. This is 
due to large population differences between the countries, and that Sub-Saharan countries in 
general have a very high population growth rate. Additionally, it is natural that populations 
grow over time. Population growth can be seen in in relation to infant mortality. Infant mortality 
has declined over time in most countries, as such more children grow up, leading to high 




Chapter 5: Results and Analysis 
 
In this chapter, the results of the panel data regression analysis will be presented and 
discussed. As discussed in chapter three, the results from two models will be compared in the 
analysis: one model excluding and one model including the interaction term. Two regression 
tables including two models will be presented as the main results. After the main results, the 
robustness of the models will be tested. I will focus on the focal relationship when commenting, 
but I will also comment briefly on the control variables. Table 5.1 display the expected direction 
of the coefficient of the focal variables in the hypothesis presented in chapter two. When 
referring to Chinese aid in the analysis, I am referring to the variable on the number of Chinese 
projects, and DAC aid refers to DAC aid as share of GDP.  
 
5.1. Main results 
5.1.1. Focal relationship  
Table 5.2. displays the effects of the focal relationship in the models. Model 1 presents 
the relationship of Chinese aid and DAC aid on quality of government, and Model 2 presents 
the effect of the interaction term on quality of governance. This first regression table does not 
include the control variables presented in chapter three. The simple models are included for two 
reasons. The first reason is to analyze the focal relationship without the impact of the control 
variables. Secondly, the inclusion of a model excluding the control variables, opens up for 
comparison with the model including the control variables. As such, it is interesting to analyze 
if the focal variables changes when including the control variables in Table 5.2. The first table 
presents in general terms how Chinese aid and DAC aid affects quality of government. Based 
on the literature review and the hypotheses, the relationship between the variables could be both 





5Table 5.2. Focal Relationship: Including and Excluding the Interaction Term 
 Model 1: Focal relationship  Model 2: Focal relationship, 
including the interaction term 
Chinese projects (log) -.27 (.17) -.34 (.30) 
DAC/GDP (log) .41 (.24)* .32 (.38) 
Interaction30 (Chinese 
projects*DAC/GDP) 
 .04 (.15) 










Observations 294 294 
Countries 29 29 
AIC -1307.5 -1309.9 
BIC -1318.5 -1324.7 
Level of significance: *= p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 (two-tailed test) (Dahlberg, et al., 2017; Teorell b), et 
al., 2017; Strange, et al., 2015) 
 In Model 1, the coefficient of Chinese aid is negative, which indicates that Chinese aid 
has a negative effect on QOG. This is the expected effect of H3: “The more development aid 
from China, the worse governance within developing countries” The coefficient tells us that 
when Chinese aid increases with one percent31, QOG decreases with 0.27 units. However, the 
relationship is not statistically significant. The coefficient of DAC aid is positive, which 
indicates that higher levels of DAC aid has a positive effect of level of QOG. The coefficients 
tells us that when DAC aid increases with one percent, QOG increases with 0.41 units. The 
relationship is significant at a 10 percent level, which does indicate that higher levels of DAC 
aid could have a positive and statistically significant effect on QOG, which is the expected 
effect of H1: “The more development aid from DAC donors, the better governance within 
developing countries”. 
 In Model 2, neither Chinese aid nor DAC aid are statistically significant, however, it is 
the interaction term that is of interest. As mentioned in chapter three, the variables on Chinese 
aid and DAC aid are only included in the Model 2 because they are important for the error term 
(Allison, 1999, p. 168). The interaction term is far from statistically significant. The results 
indicate that the effect of DAC aid on QOG does not depend on level of Chinese aid. This would 
                                                          
30 The variables in the interaction term are logarithmically transformed  
31 The coefficients will be interpreted as percentages because they are logarithmically. This is the case 
with all the logarithmically transformed variables in all models (Allison, 1999, pp. 154-155).   
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be a very interesting finding, as China is repeatedly accused of diminishing the effectiveness of 
DAC aid. I will elaborate on the interaction term in the full model.  
 Sigma U and sigma E tell us that the majority of variance in QOG is due to differences 
between countries, because sigma U is much larger than sigma E. Using random effects 
estimates instead of fixed effects estimates could therefore be a better fit. However, as 
elaborated on in chapter three, the preconditions for running a random effects estimation are 
violated. The interclass correlation, measured by rho, is very high in both estimations. In both 
models, 96 percent of the variance is due to differences across panels. This confirms that QOG 
is highly dependent on previous values32. The high rho also suggests that QOG does not change 
much  Both the AIC and the BIC values indicate that Model 1 fits the data better than Model 2, 
because the values are lower in Model 1. Higher values indicate worse explanatory power 
(Midtbø, 2012, pp. 101-102). The difference in 2.48 in AIC and 6.17 in BIC between the 
models, give positive support for Model 1. In the bivariate regression model (See Table 2 in the 
Appendix), the coefficient of Chinese development aid is negative, and the coefficient of DAC 
aid is positive, but neither of the results are statistically significant.  
5.1.2. Full Model 
 The models in Table 5.3. analyze the relationship of the Chinese aid and DAC aid on 
QOG, and control for GDP per capita, democracy, population, political stability and infant 
mortality. The control variables are included to rule out spurious explanations. The control 
variables are the influences that I wish to exclude form the estimate of the focal relationship or 
the variables that are associated with the dependent variable. They can also be thought of as 
“rival independent variables” that represent competing theoretical explanations. Hence, control 
variables are used to rule out the possibility that the focal relationship is redundant with other 
inferences on the dependent variable (Aneshensel, 2013, p. 200). From the literature review and 
hypotheses generation, the effects of the focal variables could go either way. 
  
                                                          




6Table 5.3. Full model: Including and Excluding the Interaction Term 
 Model 1: Full model Model 2: Full model, 
including the interaction 
term 
Focal variables   
Chinese projects (log) -.34 (.18)* -.39 (.33) 
DAC/GDP (log) .24 (1.26) .19 (.40) 
Interaction33 (Chinese 
projects* DAC/GDP) 
 .02 (.16) 
Control Variables   
GDP Per Capita  
(in 100 $) (log) 
2.01 (1.25) 2.05 (1.25) 
Democracy (Dichotomous) .70 (.78) .7 (.78) 
Population  (in 1000) .00 (.00) * .00 (00) * 
Political Stability .24 (.69) .24 (.70) 
Infant Mortality .12 (.05)** .12 (.75)** 










Observations 227 227 
Countries 29 29 
AIC -979.39 -981.45 
BIC -1006.79 -1012.28 
Level of significance: *= p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 (two-tailed test) (Dahlberg, et al., 2017; Teorell b), et 
al., 2017; Strange, et al., 2015) 
As in Table 5.2., Model 1 in table 5.3. indicate that Chinese aid has a negative effect on 
QOG, and that DAC aid has a positive effect on QOG. When including the control variables 
DAC aid is no longer statistically significant at a 10 percent level in Model 1. However, Chinese 
aid is now statistically significant at a 10 percent level in Model 1. The interaction term in 
Model 2 is still not statistically significant when including the control variables in the equation. 
The AIC and BIC values indicate that Model 1 has better explanatory power than Model 2, 
which corresponds with the AIC and BIC values in Table 5.2.  
In Model 1, the coefficients of Chinese aid is -.34, which indicates that when Chinese 
aid increases with one percent, QOG decreases with 0.34 units. A decrease of 0.34 units is quite 
small on a scale from 0 to 100. However, it is important to keep in mind that the logarithmically 
                                                          
33 The variables in the interaction term are logarithmically transformed 
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transformed variable on Chinese aid ranges from 0.6931 and 4.5643 (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 
4). Additionally, an increase of one percent is a very small increase in aid, especially when 
measuring numbers of Chinese projects. Therefore, it can be more interesting to look at the 
coefficient when Chinese aid increases with ten percent instead of one. By multiplying .41 with 
10, we find that when Chinese projects increase with ten percent DAC aid increases with 4.1 
percent on average. The coefficient of DAC aid is .2487, which indicates that when DAC aid 
increases with one percent, QOG increases with .24 units. The values of DAC aid varies 
between -3.0123 and 4.761. Here it is interesting to look at when DAC aid increases with more 
than one percent. When DAC aid increases with ten percent, QOG increases with 2.4 units on 
average.   
A change of 4.1 and 2.4 units when Chinese aid and DAC aid increases with 10 percent 
is not very high. However, it is expected that it takes time to change good governance in 
countries. The descriptive statistics in Table 4.2. in chapter four demonstrate that QOG on 
average is very low in the Sub-Saharan African countries in the analysis. On a scale from 0 to 
100, the highest value on QOG in the dataset is 66.  
The results are similar to the results in Table 5.2., and they go hand in hand with the 
expected effect in H1 and H3. This correlates with the views of many Western donors; namely, 
that Western aid is promoting better governance in Africa, and that China provides rough aid 
that promotes worse governance and support of rough states. The p-value of Chinese aid is 
0.074 and therefore statistically significant at a 7.4 percent level. DAC aid has a p-value of 
0.364 and is therefore far from being statistically significant. The models in Table 3 in the 
Appendix, display the effect of Chinese aid when DAC aid is excluded from the models, and 
DAC aid when Chinese aid is excluded from the models.  The results are very similar to the 
models where both variables are included. The effect of Chinese aid is the same when DAC aid 
is excluded, but the positive effect of DAC aid is greater when Chinese aid is included in the 
model. The effect of DAC aid is far from statistically significant. This suggests that the model 
is robust to the inclusion of both focal variables. 
In Model 2, the coefficients of the constitutive term have to be interpreted in a specific 
way. The coefficients of DAC aid in Model 2 does not report the average effect of change in 
the variables on QOG. The coefficients only report the effect of the variables when Chinese 
development aid equals zero. Similarly, the coefficients of Chinese development aid only 
captures the effect of Chinese development aid when DAC aid is zero. Chinese projects never 
have the value of zero. As demonstrated in Table 4.2., the minimum value of the variable is 
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0.6931. Hence, it is incorrect to say that a positive and significant coefficient on DAC aid (or 
Chinese aid) indicates that an increase in DAC aid (or Chinese aid) is expected to lead to an 
increase in QOG (Brambor, et al., 2006, pp. 71-72). As explained in chapter three, it is possible 
to calculate the coefficients of DAC aid on QOG at different levels of Chinese aid34. This is 
calculates in table 5.4.: 
7Table 5.4. The effect of DAC aid on QOG at different levels of Chinese aid, full model 
with interaction term 
Chinese aid  
 
Effect (coefficients) of DAC aid on QOG at different 
levels of Chinese aid  
Log value Number of projects 
.6931 2 -.393 + (.0205 * .6931) =        -.3787 
1.7917 6 -.393 + (.0205 * 1.7917) =      -.3562 
2.3978 11 -.393 + (.0205 * 2.3978) =      -.3438 
2.7725 16 -.393 + (.0205 * 2.7725) =      -.3361 
3.4965 30< -.393 + (.0205 * 3.4965) =      -.3213 
4.5643 96 (max) -.393 + (.0205 * 4.5643) =      -.2994 
Dependent variable: QOG. (Dahlberg, et al., 2017; Teorell b), et al., 2017; Strange, et al., 2015; Allison, 1999, 
pp. 167-169) 
The coefficients at all levels of Chinese aid are negative, this indicates that Chinese 
development aid in general has a negative impact on DAC aid`s effect on QOG within countries 
over time. What is interesting is that the negative effect is bigger at higher levels of Chinese 
aid. The coefficient of the lowest value of Chinese aid is -.3787, which corresponds to two 
Chinese aid projects in the non-logarithmically transformed variable. The coefficient of the 
highest value of Chinese aid is -.2994, which corresponds with 96 Chinese aid projects in the 
non-logarithmically transformed variable. In other words, Chinese development aid does have 
a negative impact on DAC aid`s effect on QOG within countries. However, the more Chinese 
development aid, the smaller the negative effect. This is why the coefficient of the interaction 
term is positive, despite Chinese aid on average has a negative impact on the effect of DAC aid 
on QOG. The results then only partly corresponds with the expectation in H4. Nevertheless, 
because the interaction term is far from statistically significant with a p-value of .859, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected.  
The results of the control variables do not change substantially form Model 1 to Model 
2. This is because the interaction term constitutes of the focal variables, and therefore do not 
                                                          
34 Coefficient of Chinese aid + (coefficient of interaction term * different levels of Chinese aid) 
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provide substantially new information into the model. Higher GDP per capita has a positive 
effect on QOG in both models, but the coefficients are not statistically significant.  
Democracy has a positive effect on QOG. Because the democracy variable is 
dichotomous, the coefficient measures how much QOG increases when a country goes from 
not being a non-democracy to being a democracy. The variable is far from statistically 
significant. Population seems to have a positive effect on QOG, but the effect is very small with 
a coefficient of .0002. This indicates that when a population increases with 1000 people, QOG 
increases with .0002. It is important to remember that an increase of 1000 people in a population 
of several millions is quite small. The effect is statistically significant at a 10 percent level.  
Political stability has a positive effect on QOG within countries over time. Countries 
with higher political stability also have higher levels of QOG. Because I operate with two tailed 
tests, this indicates that countries with worse political stability also have lower QOG. The result 
is far from statistically significant. The coefficient of infant mortality is positive, which 
indicates that countries with higher infant mortality rates have higher QOG. The result is 
statistically significant at a 5 percent level. The result does not align with the theoretical 
expectation that higher rates of infant mortality is associated with lower QOG, as explained in 
chapter 4. As with population, it is important to look at the size of the effect. The coefficient 
tells us that when infant mortality increases with one, that is one out of 1000 live births, QOG 
increases with .12 in both models. Hence, despite the relationship being statistically significant, 
the effect is very small.  
Sigma U and sigma E indicates that the variation is bigger between countries than within 
countries, as in the models in table 5.2. Rho is very high in both models in table 5.3., 97 percent 
of the variance is caused by differences across panels. As in table 5.2., this is due to 
autocorrelation in the models. The number of observations has decreased in the full models, but 
the number of countries remain the same. The higher number of missing values could have an 
impact on the results in the full models compared to the focal models in table 5.2. The AIC and 
BIC values indicate that Model 1 fits the data better than Model 2, because the values are 
smaller in Model 1.  
5.1.3. Preliminary Theoretical Interpretation 
 Model 1 in the full model indicates that Chinese development aid on average has a 
negative impact on QOG within countries over time, and that DAC aid on average has a positive 
impact on QOG within countries. The direction of the results correlates with the expected effect 
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in “H1: DAC aid has a positive effect on good governance” and “H3: Chinese aid has a negative 
impact on god governance”.  
That Chinese aid is negative indicates that we can rule out H5: “The more Chinese 
development aid, the better governance within countries”, despite not rejecting the null-
hypothesis of H3. This is because of the absence of a positive effect. The conclusion that 
Chinese aid does not lead to better governance do make sense; it is not the objective of Chinese 
aid to create better governance. The only political conditions on Chinese aid are related to not 
recognizing Taiwan. It is not likely that this condition will have positive effects on QOG. On 
the other hand, it is not an objective of China to diminish QOG in recipient countries. The 
motive is simply to cooperate with the government in the recipient country, regardless of their 
quality of government. I have argued in chapter two that China might prefer to cooperate with 
countries that have lower QOG, because it can be easier to do business with such regimes, 
compared to navigating through complex bureaucratic systems. However, it is the effect of 
China after they have chosen to give aid to a country that is of interest. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this analysis, it is not important that China chose to give aid to countries with low 
quality of governance: but what happens when they have determined to give aid to a country, 
over time.  
It is important to remember the problem of endogeneity when interpreting the results 
from the regressions. The results demonstrate that Chinese aid and DAC aid could have an 
effect on QOG within countries over time, but the opposite might also be the case. As mentioned 
in chapter two, China could choose to give more aid to countries that on average have lower 
QOG than the countries that the DAC donors choose to giver aid to. As such, it could be the 
level of QOG in a country that determines the amount of Chinese aid and DAC aid, or the 
variables could affect each other simultaneously. To account for this reverse effect, I will be 
careful when interpreting causality.  
The interaction term goes in the opposite direction than expected in H4. Despite the 
effect of Chinese aid being negative, larger amounts of Chinese leads to smaller negative effect 
on the effectiveness of DAC aid. A possible explanation for the relationship mentioned in the 
literature could be that DAC donors respond to more Chinese aid by applying more conditions 
on recipients. In this case, more conditions could moderate the negative effect of Chinese aid 
on the effectiveness of DAC aid. The theoretical explanation behind H4 is that Western donors 
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respond to more Chinese aid by applying fewer conditions35. The high p-values of the focal 
variables in Model 1 and Model 2 indicate that the chance of committing a type 1 error is very 
high. Nevertheless, a result that is not statistically significant does not necessarily equal an 
insignificant finding. If the model is robust, the results could indicate that it does not make a 
difference whether aid is coming from China or from the DAC donors in relation to good 
governance. If this is the case, it could be a very interesting finding for both theoretical reasons 
and for policy implications, as this is one of the main critiques of Chinese aid in Africa.  
 
5.2. The Robustness of the Results 
As discussed in the method chapter, panel data designs are non-randomized; it is 
therefore many ways to model the data. Hence, it is important to check the robustness of the 
main models. A common exercise in empirical econometric studies is to check how core 
regression coefficient estimates behave when the regression specifications is modified in some 
way, typically by adding or removing repressors36. If the signs and magnitude of the estimated 
regression coefficients are plausible, this is often taken as a sign that the model is robust (Ly & 
White, 2014, p. 194). The robustness of a regression model is also related to the regression 
assumptions. If any of the models violate the regression assumptions, the model is less robust.   
I will first check the robustness of the model by operationalize Chinese development aid 
as percentage of GDP instead of number of aid projects. Secondly, I will run a model excluding 
the variable on political stability because it is highly correlated with QOG. Thirdly, I will run a 
model where the control variable GDP per capita is exchanged with GNI per capita. In this 
section, I will only run the full models. Lastly, the regression assumptions and how the 
regression assumptions are modified not to violate the assumptions are elaborated on. As in the 
last section, Model 1 excludes the interaction term, and Model 2 includes the interaction term. 
                                                          
35 See “2.3.1. How Chinese Development Aid Can Lead to Worse Governance” in chapter two. 
36 “The usage of the term “robust” must not be confused with the concept of robustness in the statistics 
literature, which refers to the insensitivity of an estimator to adding or removing sample observation, 
typically extreme in some way. A more accurate terminology for “robustness” here might be 
“insensitivity to covariate selection”.” (Ly & White, 2014, p. 194). The concept of robustness that is 




5.2.1. Chinese Aid as Share of GDP in the Recipient Country  
 A normal approach when checking the robustness of the results is to change variables 
to see if the results are vulnerable to change. Because the data on Chinese aid is one of a kind 
– it does not exist other comparable and openly available quantitative data on Chinese aid – it 
is not possible to compare the results of Chinese aid with other quantitative sources. However, 
in the dataset form AidData, there is a monetary amount attached to each project. I have used 
the attached amount to create a variable on Chinese development aid as share of GDP in each 
country-year37. Because the operationalization of the variable is different from the project 
variable on Chinese aid, it could generate different results. 
8Table 5.5. Chinese Projects as Share of GDP 
 Model 1:  Model 2: 
Focal Variables   
China/GDP (log) -.14 (.08) * -.21 (.18) 
DAC/GDP (log) .02 (.37) .12 (.45) 
Interaction38 
(China/DAC*DAC/GDP) 
 .03 (.09) 
Control Variables   
GDP Per Capita (in 100 $) (log) 1.42 (1.52) 1.40 (1.53) 
Democracy (Dichotomous) .56 (1.02) .53 (1.02) 
Population (in 1000) .00 (.00)  .00 (.00) 
Political Stability .73 (.92) .73 (.92) 
Infant Mortality .13 (.06) ** .13 (.06) ** 










Observations 145 145 
Countries  25 25 
AIC -637.92 -639.77 
BIC -661.73 -666.56 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance: *= p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 (two-tailed test) 
(Dahlberg, et al., 2017; Teorell b), et al., 2017; Strange, et al., 2015) 
The results in Table 5.5. are similar to the results from the main models in table 5.3. 
Despite the two variables on Chinese aid measuring the same phenomena they are only weakly 
correlated. When running a bivariate correlation analysis on the two measurements, the value 
                                                          
37 See chapter 4, for detailed description of the variable on Chinese development aid as share of GDP.  
38 The variables in the interaction term are logarithmically transformed 
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is only 0.1839. As in Model 1 in table 5.3., the coefficient of China/GDP is negative, which 
indicate that Chinese aid has a negative effect on Quality of Government. As in Table 5.3., the 
relationship is statistically significant below a 10 percent level. This suggests that Chinese aid 
has an impact on QOG within countries over time, and that the effect is robust. The coefficient 
of DAC aid is positive in both models, but the relationship is far from statistically significant 
in any of the models. The coefficients of China/GDP are smaller in the models in Table 5.5 than 
in the main models, which indicates the effect of China/GDP is smaller than the effect of 
Chinese projects. This is very likely to be connected to the monetary amount being a very small 
proportion of GDP.  
The control variables change somewhat: all control variables have a smaller effect on 
QOG than in the main models, except from the effect of political stability, which increases. 
They are, however, not statistically significant in Table 5.5. The most obvious reason why the 
model change is because of a bigger number of missing values on the China/GDP variable than 
on the Chinese projects variable.  
Because the models are generated using fixed effects, and therefore measure the average 
effect within countries across years, the exclusion of the large number of observations and four 
countries are likely to affect the averages. Despite these changes, I will argue that the model is 
robust to changing the measurement of Chinese aid. However, the model lose much information 
when changing the China variable; 82 observations and 4 countries. The results from the main 
models are therefore better at generalizing the effect of aid, which is the objective of the thesis. 
Despite the decrease in the effectiveness of the focal variables, the direction and significance 
level of the focal variables do not change. I will therefore conclude that the model is robust to 
changing the variable on Chinese development aid.  
5.2.2. Excluding Political Stability  
 The control variable political stability is highly correlated with QOG40. The most likely 
explanation of why the variables are highly correlated is because the variable political stability 
is collected form the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) (Teorell, et al., 2017, pp. 598-
599). The WBGI are the disaggregated good governance indicators from the World Bank. 
                                                          
39 See Appendix Table 1 
40 Correlation value of 63.06 in a bivariate correlation analysis. As I will demonstrate in the section on 
regression assumptions, the variables does not suffer from multicollinearity just form correlation.  
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Political stability per se is not a part of the ICRG indicator of good governance, but because the 
World Bank sees political stability as a feature of good governance, it could affect the results.   
9Table 5.6. Excluding Political Stability 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Focal Variables   
Chinese projects (log) -.35 (.18) * -.48 (.32) 
DAC/GDP (log) .38 (.25) .23 (.39) 
Interaction41 
(China/DAC*DAC/GDP) 
 .07 (.15) 
Control Variables   
GDP Per Capita (in 100 $) (log) 3.71 (1.21) *** 3.78 (1.21) *** 
Democracy (Dichotomous) .62 (.78) .61 (78) 
Population (in 1000) .00 (.00) *** .00 (.00) 
Infant Mortality .04 (.05)  .04 (.05)  










Observations 246 246 
Countries  29 25 
AIC -1073.66 -1075.51 
BIC -1098.20 -1103.55 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance: *= p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 (two-tailed test) 
(Dahlberg, et al., 2017; Teorell b), et al., 2017; Strange, et al., 2015) 
 When excluding political stability, the focal variables do not change substantially. The 
coefficient of Chinese aid is still negative and statistical significant at a 10 percent level. The 
size of the coefficient is somewhat larger in the model excluding political stability. A p-value 
of 0.06 indicates that the coefficient is close to being statistically significant at a 5 prevent level. 
The coefficient of DAC aid is still positive, but the size of the coefficient is much larger here. 
The effects is still far from statistically significant in Model 1. 
In Model 2, none of the focal variables are statistically significant. The coefficients of 
Chinese aid is still negative and the coefficient of DAC aid is still positive. The positive value 
of the interaction term indicate that, as in the model including political stability, when the 
amount of Chinese aid increases, the negative impact of Chinese aid on the effectiveness of 
                                                          
41 The variables in the interaction term are logarithmically transformed 
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DAC aid decreases. The results are therefore very similar to the results of Model 2 in the main 
model.  
The control variables, on the other hand, do change as a result of removing political 
stability. GDP per capita is now statistically significant at a 1 percent level, and the effect is 
bigger than in the main model. Going from being a non-democracy to a democracy still has a 
positive effect on QOG. However, the relationship is far from statistically significant. 
Population still has a positive effect on QOG, and the effect is now statistically significant at a 
1 percent level. The effect of population is bigger when political stability is excluded from the 
model. Infant mortality still has a positive effect on QOG. However, the effect is much smaller 
than in the main model, and the effect is no longer statistically significant at any level.  
The majority of the variance in the model is still due to differences between countries, 
as Sigma U is still much larger than Sigma E. Excluding political stability from the model leads 
to an increase in the number of observations. Regardless of the changes in the control variables, 
the focal variables does not change substantially. The level of significance and direction of the 
coefficient of the focal variables remain the same, despite the effect being somewhat bigger 
here than in the main model and the control variables changing. The main model is therefore 
robust to excluding the variable on political stability in both Model 1 and Model 2.  
5.2.3. Gross National Income Per Capita Instead of GDP Per Capita 
 There are several other ways of measuring level of economic development in a country, 
than GDP per capita. Here, GDP per capita will be replaced with Gross national income (GNI) 
per capita. GNI per capita measures all income of a country`s residents and businesses, 
regardless of where it is produced, divided by midyear population. Compared to GDP, GNI 
does not include the earnings of foreigners living in the country, but it only reports how much 




10Table 5.7. Level of Economic Development Measured as GNI Per Capita 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Focal Variables   
Chinese projects (log) -.3695 (.2247)  -.3235 (.376) 
DAC/GDP (log) .2325 (.294) .2828 (.4401) 
Interaction42 
(China/DAC*DAC/GDP) 
 -.0272 (.1777) 
Control Variables   
GNI Per Capita (in 100 $) 
(log) 
2.181 (.6636) *** 2.176 (.67) *** 
Democracy (Dichotomous) 1.166 (.1.0432) .1.1707 (1.049) 
Population (in 1000) -.0001 (.0002) -.0001 (.0002) 
Political Stability .2671 (.8375) .2649 (.8404) 
Infant Mortality -.1148 (.103)  -.1148 (.1036)  










Observations 173 173 
Countries  23 23 
AIC 758.4343 760.4239 
BIC 783.6606 788.8035 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance: *= p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 (two-tailed test) 
(Dahlberg, et al., 2017; Teorell b), et al., 2017; Strange, et al., 2015) 
 When GDP per capita is exchanged with GNI per capita, Chinese aid loses its 
significance at a 10 percent level in Model 1. The coefficient is still negative and the size of the 
effect only changes with 2.44 percentage points. DAC aid is still far from statistically significant 
in Model 1. The coefficient is still positive and the size only changes with 1.62 percentage 
points. In Model 2, the coefficient of Chinese aid is still negative, and DAC aid is still positive, 
however, the direction of the interaction term changes. The coefficient of the interaction term 
is now -.0272. This indicates that more Chinese aid over time, leads to bigger negative effect 
of DAC aid within countries43. Despite the change in direction of the effect, the interaction term 
is far from statistically significant with a p-value of 0.879.  
                                                          
42 The variables in the interaction term are logarithmically transformed 
43 If we use the same formula (-.3235 + (-.0272 * level of Chinese aid)) and the same intervals (2, 6, 
11, 16, 30, 96 Chinese aid projects) as in table 5.4. to calculate the effect of DAC aid on QOG, the 
results are the following: -0.3401, -0.3722, -.3887, -.3989, -.4186, and -.4438.  
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 The control variables in Model 1 and in Model 2 do change compared to the main 
models. GNI per capita is statistically significant at a 1 percent level, compared to GDP per 
capita that is not statistically significant at any level in the main models. As in the main models, 
the effect is positive. This indicates that the GNI per capita measure is quite different from GDP 
per capita. Model 1 is robust to changing GDP per capita to GNI per capita because the 
coefficients of the variables of interest do not change substantially. The direction of the 
coefficient are the same, the size of the effect is almost the same, and none of the focal variables 
of interest are statistically significant. In Model 2, on the other hand, the result is not robust to 
changing GDP per capita. The direction of the interaction term changes from the main model. 
However, because the effect is far from statistically significant in both the main model and here, 
the conclusions are the same; Chinese aid does not seem to affect the effectiveness of DAC aid. 
The focal variables are therefore robust to changing GDP per capita to GNP per capita, which 
indicates that the main model is robust. However, the level of significance of Chinese aid 
increases to a level over 10 percent. This makes the temporary conclusion that China has a 
negative effect on QOG less robust. 
5.2.4. Regression Assumptions 
Linearity 
 The first assumption is that the model is linear in its parameters. Linearity is one of the 
central statistical conditions for the linear regression model44. If the relationship between the 
dependent variable (DV) and the independent variables (IV) is not linear, we cannot hope to fit 
a good linear line on the relationship between the DV and IV with our coefficients. If the effect 
is not linear, we are dealing with functional form error (Aneshensel, 2013, pp. 66-67; Midtbø, 
2012, p. 130). This serious problem leads to misleading coefficients. The linearity of the models 
is tested with the command “nlcheck” in Stata45. The variables with a significant result from 
the “nlcheck”, have been checked for linearity by using scatterplots and histograms. 
 The violation of the linearity assumption could be caused by extreme values. According 
to Midtbø (115-118), there are three types of extreme values; outliers, leverage and influential 
                                                          
44 A regression model does not necessarily have to be linear. There are other methods that deal with 
non-linear models, that I will not elaborate on here. 
45 An nlcheck is used after fitting a model, by categorizing the predictors into bins, refitting the model 
including dummy variables for the bins, and then performs a joint Wald test for the added parameters. 
A significant result indicates that the linearity assumption is violated (Jann, 2008). 
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values46. It is however only influential values that violates the assumption. An influential value 
is an observation that is an outlier and has high leverage. The coefficients are sensitive towards 
influential values, and the regression equation is not able to predict them properly. Because the 
unit of analysis is countries, that are a natural part of the population, they should not be removed 
(Midtbø, 2012, p. 119).  
Many relationships in social science are curvilinear (Acock, 2014). As such, these 
relationships break the assumption of linearity. I will illustrate such a non-relationship with a 
highly relevant example. Within the theoretical and empirical field of good governance, there 
is an ongoing debate at about the non-linear relationship between good governance or 
corruption and democracy. The general theory is that, compared to authoritarian regimes, 
democratization has a negative effect on quality of government in the early stages of 
democratization. Thereafter the effect become positive. Hence, making the relationship 
between democracy and quality of government non-linear or U-shaped47. In a linear regression 
analysis, such a natural non-linear relationship would break the first assumption48.  
Several of the variables in my model have influential values and/or curvilinear 
relationship with the dependent variable. The variables in question are the Chinese aid, DAC 
aid, GDP per capita, GNI per capita, and population. The variables have therefore been 
logarithmically transformed to account for this. Logarithmically transforming the population 
variable did not change the curvelinearity. Therefore, the models include the original variable 
on population. As such, the linearity assumption is violated to some degree. However, the model 
will never be perfectly linear in reality, hence, to not violate the first assumption it is enough 
that it is close to linear (Aneshensel, 2013, pp. 66-67; Midtbø, 2012, p. 130).  
Mean Independence 
 The second regression assumption is that the independent variables are not correlated to 
the error term. In the equation, this means that the error term should be zero (Allison, 1999, p. 
124). According to Allison (1999, p. 124), the assumption of mean independence is the most 
                                                          
46 Outliers are recognized by large residuals and large deviation between predicted and observed 
values. The deviation is caused by an unusual value on the dependent variable given the values on the 
independent variables. Values with high leverage are far away from the mean (Midtbø, 2012, pp. 115-
118). 
47 The control variable on democracy in the model is dichotomous, making a u-shaped relationship 
between democracy and quality of government impossible.  
48 In my model, the variables Chinese Projects, China/GDP, DAC/GDP and GDP per capita break the 
first regression assumption. The variables have been logarithmically transformed in the models.  
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important assumption in a linear regression model49. Violations of the assumption can be caused 
by three conditions related to the error term.  
The first conditions relates to omitted independent variables. The second condition is caused 
by reverse causation50. (Allison, 1999, pp. 124-125). Reversed causation is very possible to be 
the case here, because level of QOG could determine how much aid a country receive, and from 
which country. The third condition is that if there is measurement error in the IV`s, this error 
will be a part of the ε (Allison, 1999, p. 125). There are several empirical and theoretical reasons 
why the models presented above could break the assumption of mean independence. However, 
when fixed effects is used it solved the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. This is because 
fixed effects only analyze what causes change over time in the dependent variable over time, 
within units. Secondly, variables that do not vary over time are omitted.  
Homoscedasticity 
 The third regression assumption assumes that the regression is homoscedastic, namely, 
that “the variance of the error term in each observation is constant” (Daugherty, 2011, p. 282). 
In other words, the probability of the error term reaching a given positive or negative value will 
be the same in all observations. When the assumption is not met, we have a problem with 
heteroscedasticity (Daugherty, 2011, pp. 282-283). Heteroscedasticity does not affect the 
estimates of the coefficients, but it does affects the standard errors, t-values, F-values and the 
confidence intervals of a linear regression model. As such, the test of significance is not valid, 
and one might draw wrong conclusions (Midtbø, 2012, p. 107). It is therefore important to 
control for heteroscedasticity.  
There are various graphical and formal statistical tests to detect heteroscedasticity in 
Stata. A popular rest is the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test. The null hypothesis of the BP test is that 
the variance in the error term is homoscedastic. When testing for heteroscedasticity, the result 
are significant for both the models with the Chinese aid projects variable, and the Chinese aid 
as share of GDP. Several authors (Midtbø, 2012, p. 109; Allison, 1999, p. 128; Daugherty, 
2011, pp. 192-193) suggests going through the model specification again. Even after log 
transforming the variables that break the assumption of linearity, the BP test is still significant. 
                                                          
49 Allison (1999, p. 125) argues that mean independence is critical because 1) violations can produce 
severe bias in the estimates, 2) there are often reasons to expect violations, and 3) there is no way of 
testing the violation without additional data. Because the thesis is based on non-experimental data, 
violations of the assumption is a substantial possibility. 
50 This means that the DV has an effect on the IV`s 
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A solution to the problem, suggested in the literature (Midtbø, 2012, pp. 109-110; Daugherty, 
2011, p. 297; Allison, 1999, pp. 127-128), is to use robust standard errors in the final models. 
Robust standard solves the problem of biased p-values, and makes the interpretation of the 
regressions more robust (Allison, 1999, pp. 127-128).  
Homoscedasticity 
The forth assumption is that the error term is uncorrelated, namely that there is no 
correlation between the error terms of any of the independent variables. The consequence of a 
correlation within the error term are the same as for heteroscedasticity; the results of the 
regression often conclude that there is a relationship between two variables, when it do not exist 
(Allison, 1999, pp. 128-129). However, correlation within the error term also affects the robust 
standard errors, making them misleading (Midtbø, 2012, p. 112). It is therefore important to 
solve the problem of correlated error terms.  
  In times series data and panel data analysis autocorrelation is very common51. To test 
for autocorrelation in my models and for each of the independent variables, I ran a Wooldridge 
test52. The Wooldridge test check for autocorrelation in linear panel data models. The test is 
very attractive because it requires relative few assumptions and is easy to implement (Drukker, 
2003, p. 168). A significant result indicates serial correlation53 in the model. The test is 
significant for both models. To check which variables that suffer from autocorrelation, I ran the 
test on each of the independent variables to see is they are correlated to themselves. Nearly all 
the independent variables and the dependent variable are correlated to themselves, except the 
variable on Chinese aid. The reason is that these variable represent Chinese development 
projects and when they were implemented or completed. Hence, they are bound to change more 
over time than the more continuous variable on DAC aid, that represent transfers from the 
annual budget of the donor countries in each year. For the dependent variable, positive or 
negative change is expected to take time. The Wooldridge test for the dependent variable is 
significant; it is correlated with itself. This is known as first order autoregressive, or AR(1). To 
accommodate for this problem, it is suggested to use the command “xtregar” instead of “xtreg” 
                                                          
51 Autocorrelatio in panel data is elaborated on in Chapter three.  
52 The command “xtserial” in Stata (Drukker, 2003). 
53 Serial correlation is the same as autocorrelation, but described autocorrelation in panel data and 
times series data. Dependence in the error term can also occur in cross-section data, especially for 
units within groups (Midtbø, 2012, pp. 112-113) 
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when running the regressions in Stata. Therefore, xtregar is used in all regression models54 
(Drukker, 2003; Stata Corporation, 2003, pp. 212-213; Torres-Reyna, 2007)  
Normal Distribution 
 If the error term is normally distributed, the probability of under or overestimate a value 
should be about the same. Allison (1999, 130) describes normal distribution to be the least 
important of the assumptions, because it does not affect efficiency nor unbiasedness. However, 
normal distribution is more important in small samples55, because extreme values will have a 
bigger impact on the results. In small samples, violation of the normality assumption can lead 
to inaccurate confidence intervals and p-values (Midtbø, 2012, pp. 114-115; Allison, 1999, pp. 
130-131).  
When checking for normal disturbance in the residuals, the test indicate that they are 
not normally distributed. Allison (1999, pp. 130-131) suggests to be more conservative in the 
interpretation of the p-values when the assumption is broken in smaller samples, to avoid type-
I error 56. Allison (1999, p. 130) propose to only conclude that the p-value is significant at a 1 
percent level, instead of a 5 percent when the number of observations drops below 100. In the 
analysis of the results above, I have therefore been mode careful in the interpretation of the p-
values, and discussed the strength of the coefficients at different levels of significance.    
Multicollinearity 
 Multicollinearity occurs when two or more of the independent variables are highly 
correlated. When a model suffers from multicollinearity, it is difficult to know how important 
each of them are as a predictor (Acock, 2014, p. 287). The regression assumption is that the 
independent variables should not be perfectly collinear. Hence, it is only perfect 
multicollinearity, and not high multicollinearity, that breaks the regression assumption. 
However, because high collinearity can affect the individual coefficients, I test for 
multicollinearity in Stata with a VIF-test (Variance Inflation Error) and by looking at the 
correlation matrix57 (Midtbø, 2012, p. 128; Daugherty, 2011, p. 165; Allison, 1999, p. 140). 
                                                          
54 “xtregar” also accommodates for unbalanced panels where observations are unequally spread over 
time (Stata Corporation, 2003), which is the case with the dataset (see Chapter 4).  
55 In the final models, the sample size is between 250 and 100. Allison (1999, pp. 130-131) argues that 
in a sample over 200 violation of the normality assumption is not a problem. It will probably not affect 
the confidence intervals or the p-values. He writes that is becomes critical when the sample size drops 
below 100.  
56 Type-I error: concluding that a variable has an effect when it does not (Allison, 1999, p. 131).  
57 See Table 1 in the Appendix 
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None of the variables have a high correlation above 0.50, except from political stability 
and democracy. The correlation between QOG and political stability is 0.63, and the correlation 
between QOG and democracy is 0.55. However, VIF is a more precise measure of 
multicollinearity, because each of the independent variables are measured against all the other 
independent variables. If the VIF values are larger than 10, multicollinearity is a problem 
(Midtbø, 2012, pp. 129-130). In my models, multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem. 
The VIF-values vary between 1 and 4.  
Multicollinearity is, however, very common in models including an interaction terms. 
This will increase the standard errors and makes it less likely that the interaction term will be 
statistically significant. The VIF values of Chinese aid and DAC aid respectively, is 9.72 and 
8.7458 in the full model including the interaction term. A much used solution to high 
multicollinearity is to center the relevant variables. Centering variables in a model including an 
interaction term to avoid high multicollinearity is criticized, because multicollinearity if caused 
by too little information in the data. Centering the data does not provide new data, hence, it 
cannot overcome the problem of multicollinearity (Brambor, et al., 2006, pp. 70-71). Therefore, 
this is not done in this analysis. Brambor et. al. (2006, p. 70) argue that the problem of 
multicollinearity in multiplicative interaction models is overstated. Because such models are 
interpreted differently than linear models, the problems caused by multicollinearity do not have 
big impact on the interpretation of the model.  
5.3. Chapter Summary 
 In the regression tables presented above, Chinese aid has had a negative effect on QOG 
and DAC aid has had a positive effect on QOG in all “Model 1`s”. Chinese aid is statistically 
significant at a 10 percent level in all full models except from the model where GDP per capita 
is exchanged with GNI per capita. This result makes it difficult to conclude that Chinese aid is 
in fact negative. DAC aid is only statistically significant at a 10 percent level in Model 1 when 
the control variables are excluded. Model 1 therefore seems to be quite robust, because the 
modifications does not qualitatively change the conclusions.  The results in Model 1 are the 
same as the expected effects in H1: “The more development aid form DAC donors, the better 
governance within countries” and H3: “The mode development aid from China, the worse 
governance within developing countries”. The expected effect in H2: “The more development 
aid from DAC donors, the worse governance within developing countries” ad H5: “The more 
                                                          
58 The VIF values of the control variables vary between 1 and 3. 
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development aid, the better governance within developing countries”, are rejected in all models. 
The coefficients of Chinese aid never has a positive effect on QOG, and DAC aid never has a 
negative effect on QOG. This is also the conclusion of the models in Table 2 and Table 3 in the 
Appendix.  
 In Model 2, neither the focal variables nor the interaction term is not statistically 
significant in any of the regression modifications. The effects are robust to changing the 
operationalization of Chinese aid and to the exclusion of political stability, but the direction of 
the interaction changed in Table 5.7. The effect is therefore not robust to changing GDP per 
capita to GNI per capita. However, because the effect is not statistically significant in any of 
the models, the conclusion is the same for all models; Chinese aid does not seem to have any 
effect on the effectiveness of DAC aid. This result contradicts the many accusations of the 
indirect effect of Chinese aid in the literature, and rejects the expected effect of H4. 
 Allison (1999, p. 167) argues that if the interaction term statistically significant, then 
the reasonable strategy is to drop in favor of a model excluding the interaction term. The AIC 
and BIC in all regression tables shows that Model 1 explain fits the data better than Model 2. I 
will however argue that both Model 1 and Model 2 are important to different parts of the theory. 
This is because Model 2 relates to the interacting effect of Chinese aid on the effectiveness of 
DAC aid. In the next chapter, I will argue why the findings in both models can be important for 
better understanding the effect of Chinese development aid.  
The robustness tests of the models indicate that the focal independent variables are quite 
robust. The direction of the interaction term do change when GDP per capita is exchanged with 
GNI per capita. However the effect is far from statistically significant, therefore the outcome 
of the regression does not change. 
The regression assumptions are controlled for in all models. The models do suffer form 
autocorrelation, or AR (1), but the problem is accommodated for by using the command 
“xtregar” in all models in Stata. The assumptions of linearity, heteroscedasticity and normal 
distribution is to some degree violated, but the most severe violations are removed by 




Chapter 6: Discussion of Results 
In this chapter, I will discuss the results from the analysis above in relation to the 
hypotheses and the theoretical framework presented in chapter two. I will first present some of 
the limits of the analysis, and argue why it has some important contributions regardless of the 
limitations. Second, the effectiveness of DAC aid will be discussed. Third, the effectiveness of 
Chinese aid will be discussed. Following, I will summarize the finding of the thesis and any 
concluding remarks. Lastly, the implications of the thesis and suggestions for future research 
will be presented. 
 
6.1. Limitations of the Analysis 
Before discussing the results from the analysis, I will present some of the limitation of 
this study. First, the dataset from AidData is based on media based data collection, and not 
official data form the Chinese government (Strange, et al., 2015, pp. 15-17). As such the dataset 
report the number of aid projects to recipient counties, not the total aid budget distributed to 
recipients form the Chinese government. The variable is therefore a proxy on Chinese aid. As 
discussed in chapter four, this does create validity problems.  
There is some uncertainty connected to the level of aggregation of the QOG variable 
and the variables of Chinese aid and DAC aid. In this thesis, DAC aid is defined as all types of 
aid commitments, regardless of purpose and donor. If some types of aid have a positive effect 
of good governance and some types of aid have a negative effect on good governance, the result 
can turn out non-significant in statistical analysis. The same argument applies to the aggregated 
dependent variable. Development aid might have a positive effect on one aspect of good 
governance, a negative effect on second aspect, and no effect on a third aspect. If this is the 
case, then this might be the reason why DAC aid is not statistically significant in this analysis. 
I will illustrate this with an example form the literature. Ear (2007, pp. 276-277) uses 
disaggregated governance indicators to study the effectiveness of aid on governance. She found 
that aid had a positive effect on political stability, but a negative effect on government 
effectiveness and regulatory stability. Her findings suggests that aid can play a positive role 
when its components are considered, and that development aid can have different effects on 
good governance depending on its level of aggregation.  
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Despite some methodological challenges, the dataset on Chinese aid from AidData is 
new and pioneering within collecting data on Chinese aid. The dataset is therefore the most 
comprehensive dataset on Chinese aid to Africa that is openly available today. Now that data is 
available, it is both important and needed to use it to try to fill the gap in the literature. Given 
the scale of Chinese aid, ignoring its effect when studying development aid can bias empirical 
results and lower research validity. Therefore, I argue that is it is important that the new dataset 
is used is this type of analysis. Additionally, the robustness checks in chapter five show that the 
models are quite robust. Hence, it is possible to draw some conclusions based on the results. I 
will now illustrate how the results from the hypotheses relate to theory. In Table 6.1., a brief 




11Table 6.1. A Brief Summary of the Hypotheses and the Main Findings 
Hypothesis Main Findings Support of 
Hypothesis 
H1: The more 
development aid from 
DAC donors, the better 
governance within 
developing countries. 
The effect of DAC aid is positive in all models 
presented in chapter five and in the regressions in the 
appendix. This means that more DAC aid over time 
within countries, has a positive effect on QOG. 
However, the effect is not statistically significant in 
any of the full models.  
No 
H2: The more 
development aid from 
DAC donors, the worse 
governance within 
developing countries. 
Because the effect of DAC aid is positive in all 
models, the hypothesis is discarded. However, the 
effect of DAC aid is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the effect is 
positive either. 
No 
H3: The more 
development aid from 




The effect of Chinese aid is negative in all models and 
statistically significant at a 10 percent level59. This 
indicate that Chinese aid does have a general negative 
effect on QOG within countries over time.  
Partly, but only 
at a 10 percent 
significance 
level 
H4: Higher levels of 
Chinese aid has a 
negative indirect effect on 
the effectiveness of DAC 
aid on good governance 
The indirect effect of Chinese aid on the effectiveness 
of DAC aid within countries is negative. However, the 
more Chinese aid, the smaller is the negative indirect 
effect of China over time. However the effect not 
statistically significant. This suggests that the idea 
that Western aid is less effective when China gives 
more aid is not supported. 
No 
H5: The more Chinese 
development aid, the 
better governance within 
developing countries. 
The effect of Chinese aid is negative in all models and 
statistically significant at a 10 percent level. The 
results clearly show that Chinese aid does not have a 




                                                          
59 The level of significance varies between 6 percent and 7.4 percent in the different models in chapter 
five. However, it is not statistically significant then GDP per capita is changed with GNI per capita. 
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6.2. The Effectiveness of DAC aid on Quality of Government 
The first two hypotheses relate to DAC and Model 1, which is the model excluding the 
interaction term. The hypotheses H1 “The more development aid from DAC donors, the better 
governance within development countries”, and H2 “The more development aid form DAC 
donors, the worse governance within developing countries” are mutually exclusive in this 
analysis. The hypotheses represent two different theoretical views of how aid can affect good 
governance in recipient countries. On the one hand, it is argued that development aid can have 
a positive effect on good governance by building better bureaucracy and local institutions by 
releasing governments form binding constraints. Additionally, Western aid often comes with 
conditions attached on good governance and policy reform, which in turn can lead to better 
governance (Knack, 2001, p. 311; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, pp. 255-260; Rajan & 
Subramaniam, 2007, pp. 322-323).  
On the other hand, it is stated that aid can affect good governance negatively. Despite 
the good intentions of donors, foreign aid can diminish good governance by encouraging 
corruption and rent-seeking activities, fuel conflict between interest groups, and divert human 
resources form the public and private sector to aid-funded projects (Ear, 2007; Knack, 2001; 
Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Quazi & Alam, 2015; Asongu, 2014; Tavares, 2003). Additionally, 
it is claimed that the intentions of donors are not always good. Donors often give aid for 
geopolitical or economic reasons, where the survival of the sitting government in the recipient 
country is the objective of aid allocations, regardless of good governance. This is especially 
important when studying bilateral aid, because the donors are country governments with their 
own foreign policy and development objectives (Smith, 2007; Mesquita & Smith, 2009).  
The main findings in chapter five is that DAC aid on average has a positive effect on 
QOG within countries over time, but the effect is far from statistically significant in any of the 
models. The results indicate that DAC aid has no average effect on QOG, because neither of 
the hypotheses are confirmed. This means that it is not possible to rule out that DAC aid has an  
effect on QOG, but at the same time is it not possible to rule out that is does not. However, 
some of the theories presented above are more relevant to explain this outcome.  
First, an argument presented in chapter two is that external resources can help good as 
well as bad governments survive, by reducing the cost of doing nothing and reducing the cost 
of political reform. As such, how development aid affects QOG depends on the existing 
government and institutions in the recipient country, and not on the pressure from donors 
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(Knack, 2001). This argument seems very plausible. However, because the analysis is based on 
a fixed effects estimation, it is not possible to control for such differences between countries. 
The aim is at finding out if DAC aid has a general effect in recipient countries, regardless of 
such country-differences. The results indicate that it does not. Because country-specific 
attributes are omitted, I cannot conclude based on these results that country differences is the 
reason why there is no general effect in the data. This must be left for future analysis.   
Second, bilateral DAC aid represent many countries with different foreign policies 
regarding development aid and relations with recipient countries. As such, development aid 
from the US can be very different form aid from Norway or Denmark. Bilateral donors give 
different types of aid for different purposes. Bilateral aid is therefore a very complex 
phenomenon. As such, different types of bilateral aid from DAC donors may affect good 
governance differently. The variable on DAC aid is the sum of all DAC aid commitments per 
year. Despite being a much-used measure when one wants to generalize Western aid, the 
general measure might fail to control for the complexity of the phenomenon. This argument 
also discredits some of the literature where the argument is that Western aid have either a 
positive or negative effect on QOG in general. Maybe these theories tries too hard to generalize 
something that is very dependent on context. Hence, the results does indicate that generalizing 
the effect of Western bilateral aid within countries over time, will lead to results that are not 
significant.  
To the degree that the results can be relied on, they question the view that Western aid 
is good wile Chinese aid is bad. This is a very interesting finding, because of the harsh critique 
of China in Africa form Western donors. When it seems as if DAC aid does not have any general 
effect on QOG over time, and their intensions might not be as good as they communicate.  
 
6.3. The Effectiveness of Chinese Aid on Quality of Government 
 The hypotheses H3: “The more development aid from China, the worse governance 
within developing countries” and H5: “The more Chinese development aid, the better 
governance within developing countries”, are also mutually exclusive. The hypotheses 
represent two different views of Chinese aid mentioned in the literature and discussions on 
Chinese aid. The most common view is that Chinese involvement will diminish governance. 
However, some scholars argue that the negative consequences of Chinese aid may be 
exaggerated, and that Chinese aid might have some positive consequences on governance. The 
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main findings in chapter five show that Chinese aid on average has a negative effect on QOG 
over time. The result is significant at a 10 percent level, or more precisely, at a 7.4 percent level 
in the main model in chapter five, except form when GDP per capita is exchanged with GNI 
per capita. H5 is therefore discarded; there is evidence in the data that Chinese aid does not have 
a positive effect on QOG. However, H3 is only partly supported, because there is some 
uncertainty related to the level of significance. Hence, Chinese aid does not have a positive 
effect on QOG, but the effect may not be negative either.  
China values the principles of non-interference and South-South cooperation over 
political conditions and a traditional donor-recipient relationship. Therefore, China does not try 
to change the internal politics in the countries where they provide aid, as opposed to DAC 
donors. A central claim made by critics of Chinese aid is that China provide aid for their own 
self-interest and not because they are interested in developing African countries. As such, it is 
argued in the theory in chapter two that China is interested in the natural resources in Africa. 
The results can only say something about the possible effect of Chinese aid on QOG within 
countries over time, and not how Chinese aid differs between countries with regards to such 
self-interest. This is because natural resources do not vary over time and fixed effects omits all 
time-constant variables from the estimation. However, the intention is to say something about 
the general effect over time, regardless of these time-constant factors. In other words: How does 
Chinese aid work over time in relation to QOG after they have chosen to give development aid 
– regardless of the existing level of QOG?  
The result that China does not have a positive effect on QOG is not surprising. The 
intentions of China is not to promote or better QOG, therefore we cannot expect that it will. It 
is especially important for China not to try to change governments in other countries, because 
they wish to promote their development aid as South-South cooperation. As such, they wish to 
contrast their aid to DAC aid, which has a clear donor-recipient relationship, where one is 
generous and has the upper hand, and the other one is grateful (Ravelo, 2017). China is quite 
clear on their motivations; they do wish to gain access to natural recourses, and to use 
development aid for diplomatic reasons, but at the same time they cooperate with recipients to 
create what they call a won-win situation. However, the aim of this thesis it not to study the 
motivations behind Chinese aid, but the effect that these motivations might have. Nevertheless, 
these motivations might be the reason why the effect if negative in all models.  
If we compare the results of DAC aid and Chinese aid on QOG, it becomes clear that 
the two types of aid are very different. First, while creating better governance is an important 
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target for most DAC donors, China does not have intensions to change the policies in the 
recipient country. Second, the way that China givers aid is in sharp contrast to the way DAC 
gives aid. This is the reason why I have argued that Chinese aid should be defined different 
from DAC aid. China gives much of its aid trough projects, often infrastructure projects, and 
Chinese ODA and Chinese official investments are highly interlined. DAC, on the other hand, 
give more aid trough for example budget support, with conditions attached, and they often have 
other objectives. Therefore, it is not surprising that the two types of aid generate different 
results. Additionally, it is somewhat expected that DAC aid does not have any general effect 
on QOG over time, because the variable consists of so many countries with different 
motivations in different counters. China, on the other hand, seems to be more interested in doing 
good business with whatever country, regardless of regime. This could be one of the reasons 
why China has a general negative effect on QOG, compared to DAC aid. Hence, China is not 
trying to worsen governance, but they are not trying to raise the level of governance either. 
The second claim about China is related to the fourth hypothesis, H4: “Higher levels of 
Chinese aid has a negative indirect effect on the effectiveness of DAC aid on good governance”. 
By offering alternative development finance to African governance, China can prevent good 
governance initiatives form traditional donors. China does have a negative effect on the he 
effectiveness of DAC aid, but the interaction goes in the opposite direction than expected. When 
Chinese aid increases over time, the negative effect of DAC aid on QOG decreases. The effect 
is not statistically significant. Therefore, I find no support for this much debated hypothesis; 
hence, H4 is discarded.  
When comparing the result of H4 to the results from the other hypotheses, this is the 
most surprising of them. It is somewhat expected that DAC aid does not have an effect on QOG 
because of the complexity of the phenomenon. In addition, it is somewhat expected that Chinese 
aid has a negative or not significant effect on QOG, and not a positive effect on QOG, because 
their intention is not to try to change the country where they give aid. However, the most 
repeated critique of China in Africa is that it will prevent good governance initiatives from 
traditional donors. Additionally, it is argued that Chinese aid will force Western donors to ask 
for less reform and policy change to stay competitive in the aid market. This is however not the 
case according the data. This result suggests that DAC donors should focus more at trying to 
cooperate with China, instead of only casting blame upon China. China will continue to expand 
its influence in the World, not just within the field of development aid. Therefore, Western 
donors should focus more on the actual effects of China, instead of Chinas intensions.  
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  The result of the interacting effect of China can be compared with the results from 
AidData`s most recent released working paper on Chinese aid globally. Here AidData tests 
whether Western aid is less effective at accelerating growth in countries that also have 
significant access to Chinese aid. They argue that China does not have any effect on the 
effectiveness of DAC aid (Dreher, et al., 2017, pp. 26-27). Their method, use of additional data 
sources, and their research question is somewhat different. However, their findings are very 
similar to the findings in this thesis. As such, they generate support for the findings I have made 
here (Dreher, et al., 2017). The fear of the effect of China might be caused by the fear that 
Western hegemony over aid and development is over. DAC donors are no longer the only actors 
that can influence African countries with the use of aid.  
The insights I have made here, suggest that more research on the effect of Chinese aid 
much is needed. All evidence point in the direction that China will expand it influence, and 
remain a major player in the field of international development aid (Grimm, 2014, pp. 993-994; 
Berthelemy, 2011, p. 6). Therefore, it is not enough to base the critique of China on 
assumptions. They need to be tested empirically; both to better predict how international aid 
will develop in the future, but also to foster more cooperation between China, the West, and 
recipient countries, to create better solutions for Africa and developing countries in other parts 
of the world in the years to come.  
 
6.4. Concluding Remarks 
This thesis was motivated by the growing importance of China as a donor, and the 
various claims that China diminishes good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The last twenty 
years the World has seen a change in the global development landscape, as emerging donors, 
with China in the lead, are representing a growing proportion of the total amount of 
development aid. By applying a theoretical framework on the possible effects of Western aid 
and Chinese aid on good governance, five hypotheses have been generated. The literature 
review and hypotheses focued on the lack of consensus the literature on aid effectiveness, and 
the lack of empirical quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of Chinese aid. The thesis has 
tried to answer the following research question:  




Through the application of the method of panel data regression analysis using fixed 
effects, this thesis has tried to find out whether China has an effect on good governance in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The dataset in this analysis consists of variables from the award-winning QOG 
dataset and the pioneering dataset on Chinese development finance from AidData from 2000 to 
2013. The findings indicate that Chinese aid does not have a positive effect on quality of 
government over time, but that it is difficult to say with certainty that the effect is negative. The 
absence of a positive effect is somewhat as expected, because China does not try to improve 
governance in recipient countries. The theoretical framework and the analysis demonstrated 
that DAC aid and Chinese aid are quite different, which is a possible reason why they generate 
different results. Moreover, the robust non-significant result of DAC aid is very likely to be 
caused by generalizing a very complex phenomenon. It is also possible that DAC aid does not 
have any general effects on QOG over time. This must be left for further analysis. 
The most critical finding in this analysis is the rejection of the hypothesis on the effect 
of Chinese aid on the effectiveness of DAC aid. The sharpest critic of China as a donor is that 
it allows recipients to “shop around” for the aid that best suits their interests and donors that is 
soft on bad governance. In turn, this will diminish the effectiveness of DAC aid. I find no 
support for this claim in this analysis. The results from this analysis suggests that DAC donors 
and critics of Chinese aid should focus more on China`s actual effects in recipient countries, 
instead of focusing on the intensions alone. As the result from DAC aid imply that conditioning 
aid on policy reform, is largely ineffective. Hence, the findings suggests that the intensions of 
donors may not have any general impact on good governance, and that it might be other factors 
that determine the success of development aid. 
 
6.4. Implications and Further Research 
 This analysis has several implications. First and foremost, it has shown the importance 
of conducting empirical evidence on the effect of Chinese aid on good governance. The findings 
on Chinese aid indicates that existing research on the theme has not taken into account the actual 
effects of Chinese aid over time. Existing research has put too much effort into analyzing the 
intensions of Chinese aid, instead of the actual effects. This is especially important with regards 
to the finding that Chinese aid does not seem to have any effect on the effectiveness of DAC 
aid, despite the repeated critique of China regarding this in the literature. It is not enough to 
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assume that Chinese aid is “bad”; these claims must be backed by robust empirical evidence, 
especially if policies are to be based on these assumptions. 
Secondly, there is evidence that Chinas principle of non-interference is challenged, and 
they are involving themselves more and more in the internal politics of countries around the 
World (Speed, 2017). In August this year, China opened its first military base on the African 
continent. China has for several years used their marine security ships to patrol the area around 
the Horn of Africa, to protect their own resources and recipient countries against Somali pirates. 
At the same time, they have been clear on their position of non-interference and refusal to 
interfere in the internal politics of the countries in Africa. As mentioned, these politics were 
challenged, after the civil war in Libya in 2011, when China evacuated 36 000 Chinese workers 
form the country. It is argued that in the aftermath of this incidence, China has realized that 
they have to involve themselves more in the politics of recipient countries to protect their own 
assets and interests. In recent years, China has taken a more active role in the UN and in the 
African Union to try to influence the political landscape in Africa (Speed, 2017; Pehnelt, 2007; 
Tan-Mullins, et al., 2010; Grimm, 2014). This has not been taken into account in this thesis, 
because data were only available from before 2013. However, it will be very interesting to 
follow this possible development in the future, and it should be included in future research when 
data becomes available. The possible politicizing of Chinese aid is a subject that should be 
studied qualitatively as well as quantitatively.  
The results suggest that the complexity of DAC aid is the reason why it turns out non-
significant in the analysis. However, if the individual DAC donors are so different that their 
positive and negative effects on governance is the explanation of the non-significant result, this 
call for better coordination. If DAC donors wish to help to lift the level of governance in Sub-
Saharan Africa and elsewhere, international cooperation and coordination of development aid 
seems very important. For the level of good governance to increase, the effects form different 
donors should not zero each other out. 
The results from this thesis clearly show that it is very important to gain more insight 
on the effects of Chinese development aid on good governance. There is room for much further 
research on the topic. The dataset I have used to answer the research question does have some 
weaknesses. Therefore, the effectiveness of Chinese aid on good governance, and the 
relationship between the two variables should be studied more closely, as more and better data 
becomes available. It is not only important to gain insight in how Chinese aid affects good 
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governance, but to find out more about the general effects of development aid and how it can 
create better governance in practice, not just in theory.  
 For future research on the subject, I will recommend to use the newly published data 
from AidData on Chinese aid globally, to control for contextual factors and country-specific 
differences. The new dataset contains data from 2000 to 2014 on 140 countries in Africa, Asia, 
the Pacific, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe that receive 
Chinese aid (Dreher, et al., 2017, pp. 1-2). The inclusion of more countries will lead to a drastic 
increase in observations, which in turn will better the data and results. This dataset makes is 
possible to compare the effects in Africa to the effects in other countries. As such, it is possible 
to check if the findings in this thesis can be generalized to recipients outside Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In addition, it should now be possible to analyze how contextual and country specific 
factors might affect the effectiveness of Chinese aid. The second recommendation I will make 
is therefore to extend the use of interacting variables in the research on the effectiveness of 
Chinese aid. It is important to broaden our knowledge on how institutions, natural resources, 
geography and so on can affect the effectiveness of China, but also to compare these effects to 
DAC aid. The within and between effect should therefore be studied more carefully. The new 
dataset form AidData was published one month before the deadline of this thesis. Therefore, 
there was not time to change the data, method, and research question to be able to use the new 
dataset in this thesis, and improve the analysis. 
The third recommendation I will make, it to use more disaggregated data on Chinese 
and DAC aid. It is possible to disaggregate Chinese aid to ODA, OOF and VOF. It would be 
very interesting to investigate whether these types of aid have different effects on good 
governance, both in general over time and between countries. The same argument applies for 
DAC aid. The results in this analysis suggest that DAC aid might be too complex to study the 
general effect of all DAC aid. To separate DAC aid from different countries or different 
purposes could generate a more nuanced picture of aid effectiveness, which should be compared 
to disaggregated aid form China. The aim here was to generalize, but in the future more specific 
analyses would be of interest. 
The last recommendation I will make is to study the effect of good governance before 
and after China became a major donor. As such, it is possible to combine the dataset from 
AidData starting year 2000, with data on good governance and DAC aid from before this time. 
This would make it possible to study if there has been any significant changes with regards to 
good governance after China entered into the aid market, compared to when DAC donors were 
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the only major players within the field of development aid. Such an analysis would strengthen 
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix 60 






GDP p. cap. 
(100) 




QOG 1.00         
Chinese 
projects 
0.042 1.00        
China/GD
P 
0.03 0.09 1.00       
DAC/GD
P 
-0.20 0.01 0.03 1.00      
GDP p. 
cap. (100) 
0.12 0.09 0.01 -0.26 1.00     
Demo. 0.17 -0.003 0.05 0.13 -0.02 1.00    
Pop. -0.001 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.20 -0.18 1.00   
Polit. 
Stabil. 
0.511 0.001 0.09 -0.01 0.17 0.3 0.36 1.00  
Infant 
mort. 
0.47 -0.19 -0.05 -0.25 -0.39 -0.22 0.09 -0.30 1.00 
 
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of the dependent variable, Quality of Government  
 
Source: (Teorell b), et al., 2017)  
  
                                                          
60 The command “corr” was used to produce the correlation matrix in Stata (Midtbø, 2012, pp. 84-86). 





Table 2. Bivariate regression tables, Chinese aid and DAC aid 




Model 3: DAC aid 
Chinese projects (log) -.2776 (.1793)   
China/GDP  -.1394 (.0809) *  
DAC/GDP (log)   .1484 (.1882) 













Observations 295 174 400 
Countries 29 25 31 
AIC 1313.868 827.3368 1680.026 
BIC 1321.242 833.6549 1688.009 
Level of significance: *= p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 (two-tailed test). Dependent variable: QOG. (Dahlberg, 
et al., 2017; Teorell b), et al., 2017; Strange, et al., 2015) 
Table 3. Full model, Chinese aid and DAC aid separately 




Model 3: DAC aid 
Chinese projects (log) -.3403 (.1916) *   
China/GDP  -.1481 (.0819) *  
DAC/GDP (log)   .2098 (.2175) 
Control variables    
GDP Per Capita  
(in 100 $) (log) 
1.9525 (1.2389) 1.4338 (1.5014) 1.7776 (1.1533) 
Democracy 
(Dichotomous) 
.6805 (.784) .5696 (1.0159) .5398 (.6018) 
Population  
(in 1000) 
.0002 (.0001) ** .0001 (.0001) .0000 (.0001) 
Political Stability .3244 (.6927) .7391 (.916) .6691 (.5552) 
Infant Mortality .1373 (.0531)*** .1371 (.0654)** .0879 (.0436)** 













Observations 228 174 309 
Countries 29 25 31 
AIC 981.9515 827.3368 1311.053 
BIC 1005.9757 833.6549 1337.187 
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Level of significance: *= p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01 (two-tailed test). Dependent variable: QOG. (Dahlberg, 
et al., 2017; Teorell b), et al., 2017; Strange, et al., 2015) 
 
Table 6: Chinese aid as share of GDP 
Variable Obs. Coun 
-tries 
Mean Std. Dev. Between 
Std. Dev.  
Within 
Std. Dev.   
Min  Max 
China/G
GDP 
200 26 .0428-2 2.3473 1.0889 2.1472 -9.6594 2.1782 






Amount of 2011 US$ attached for all 
projects in a given country-year (% of 
GDP) (logged) 
Min/max year: 2000/2013 





Table 7: GNI per capita 
Variable Obs. Coun 
-tries 
Mean Std. Dev. Between 
Std. Dev.  
Within 
Std. Dev.   






1.4401 1.4821 .0277 14.024
6 
21.8705 
Variable type Variable Measure Source 
Control Variable Gross National 
Income Per 
Capita 
GNI per capita (constant prices, 
2005 US$) Min/max year: 
2000/2013 
World Development 
Index, World Bank: QOG 
(wdi_gnicapcon2005) 
 
Definition of Gross National Index: “Gross national income divided by midyear population. 
GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net recipients of primary income 
(compensation of employees and property income) from abroad” (Teorell, et al., 2017, p. 640) 
 
Results form regression diagnostics are available upon request.  
